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Introduction:			 In	2012	the	Bank	of	Japan	(BoJ)	embarked	on	one	of	the	largest	monetary	policy	experiments	of	the	21st	century.	They	initiated	a	quantitative	easing	(QE)	program	of	monetary	expansion	in	which	the	bank	purchased	safe	assets,	primarily	Japan	government	bonds	(JGBs)	in	the	hope	that	the	firms	who	sold	these	assets	would	use	the	central	bank	reserves	they	received	in	exchange	to	buy	riskier	assets	such	as	equities.	In	the	language	of	QE	this	sequence	is	known	as	the	portfolio	rebalancing	
mechanism.	The	goal	was	that	these	rising	equity	prices	would	raise	domestic	demand,	and	subsequently	GDP,	by	inducing	both	firms	and	households	to	spend.	Households	would	spend	via	a	wealth	effect,	in	which	the	rising	values	of	the	equites	in	their	stock	portfolios	would	raise	their	confidence	to	consume.	Firms	would	be	induced	to	invest	as	rising	equity	prices	and	falling	bond	yields	made	it	easier	for	them	to	access	credit	on	private	markets.	The	program	was	led	by	governor	Kuroda	Haruhiko,	a	key	ally	of	prime	minister	Abe	Shinzo,	and	QE	constituted	the	first	arrow	of	the	‘three	arrows’	of	Abe’s	economic	program,	often	called	‘Abenomics’	the	second	and	third	arrows	being	fiscal	stimulus	and	regulatory	reform	respectively.		This	QE	program	is	unprecedented	in	size	with	Arslanalp	and	Botman	(2015:	9)	estimating	that	the	BoJ	will	own	80%	of	the	entire	JGB	market	by	2018.	Initially	this	large	scale	easing	appeared	to	working.	From	2012	to	2014	macroeconomic	indicators	showed	positive	signs	for	QE	in	Japan:	The	Nikkei	index,	consumer	price	index	(CPI)	and	GDP	all	rose	while	the	yen	depreciated	and	unemployment	fell	(Wakatabe,	2015:	113).	However,	by	late	2014	these	positive	signs	had	dried	up	with	the	output	gap	once	again	growing	and	GDP	turning	stagnant	(Wakatabe,	2015:	113-114)	whilst	the	BoJ’s	target	of	a	stable	2%	inflation	rate	remained	elusive.	Whilst	Japanese	firms	were	happy	to	sell	their	JGBs	they	did	not	re-enter	the	equity	market.	Instead	they	continued	a	practice	that	has	been	a	feature	of	Japanese	firm	behavior	since	the	1990s:	continually	accumulating	retained	earnings	in	the	form	of	cash	and	deposits	(Kang,	2014:	5-6).	Meanwhile	private,	non-residential	investment	has	significantly	slowed,	falling	from	‘around	20%	of	GDP	[in	early	1990s]	to	about	13½	percent	as	of	2013’	(Kang,	2015:	8)	This	phenomenon	in	the	private	sector	of	accumulating	liquid	assets	coupled	with	falling	investment,	will	be	generally	referred	to	in	this	project	as	corporate	surplus	hoarding.	It	is	a	phenomenon	that	the	BoJ’s	monetary	expansion	has	seemingly	
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facilitated,	with	Fujioka	(2016)	reporting	for	Bloomberg	that	as	of	the	last	of	quarter	of	2015	‘Corporate	assets	in	cash	and	deposits	reached	a	record	high	of	246	trillion	yen	($2.2	trillion),	rising	for	the	29th	consecutive	quarter.’		This	surplus	hoarding	behavior	runs	exactly	contrary	to	the	logic	of	portfolio	rebalancing,	therefore	understanding	why	QE	in	Japan	has	failed	to	meet	the	objectives	set	for	it	by	its	designers	also	requires	understanding	this	phenomenon.	That	is	why	this	project	seeks	to	answer	two	interlinked	questions:	first,	how	has	this	surplus	hoarding	behavior	disrupted	the	intended	transmission	mechanisms	of	QE?	Second,	
why	are	Japanese	firms	so	reticent	to	spend	money,	even	in	the	face	of	QE	program	to	make	them	do	exactly	that?	In	short,	the	answer	proposed	by	this	project	will	be	that	the	corporate	mega	conglomerates	that	dominate	the	Japanese	economy	known	as	
keiretsu,	are	subject	to	a	form	of	institutionalized	liquidity	preference	induced	by	the	continued	influence	of	structural	features	inherited	from	of	Japan’s	developmental	economic	model.	This	Japan	specific	iteration	of	liquidity	preference,	which	has	been	tentatively	named	here	path-dependent	liquidity	preference,	has	created	a	significant	blockage	in	the	portfolio	rebalancing	mechanism	key	to	the	success	of	QE.	This	is	because	the	underlying	assumptions	that	inform	QE,	namely	that	firms	are	rational	actors	operating	subject	to	an	exogenously	given	supply	of	money,	fundamentally	cannot	account	for	the	effect	liquidity	preference	will	have	on	QE’s	transmission	channels.		In	order	to	investigate	these	questions	and	propose	this	explanation	this	project	is	divided	into	five	chapters.	The	first	chapter	draws	particularly	on	the	work	of	dissenting	central	banker	Charles	Goodhart	(2012,	with	Asworth	2013)	as	well	as	Abenomics	supporter	Wakatabe	Masuzumi	(2015)	in	order	to	outline	the	proposed	transmission	channels	of	QE	-	the	portfolio	rebalancing	channel	and	the	bank	funding	channel	-	as	well	as	discuss	the	role	that	currency	devaluation	and	inflation	play	in	the	transmission	of	QE	particularly	in	Japan.	The	goal	of	these	sections	is	to	present	a	fair	summary	of	QE	as	its	designers	and	proponents	believe	it	will	function.	This	chapter	then	discusses	the	ontological	assumptions	that	underlie	these	transmission	mechanisms	arguing	that	although	QE	is	sometimes	associated	with	a	Keynesian	policy	program,	it	is	based	on	fundamentally	neo-classical	assumptions,	specifically	that	firms	are	rational	actors	who	are	profit	motivated	in	the	short-term.		
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The	second	chapter	addresses	the	empirical	literature	that	has	assessed	the	efficacy	of	QE	programs,	comparing	the	work	authors	such	as	Joyce	et	al	(2012)	have	done	on	comparable	programs	in	the	UK	and	US	with	empirical	assessments	of	BoJ	QE	by	Ueda	(2013)	arguing	that	in	both	cases	initial	positive	signs	have	run	into	diminishing	returns.	This	chapter	then	addresses	the	empirical	dimensions	of	corporate	surplus	hoarding	in	Japan	drawing	on	contributions	from	Kang	(2014)	and	Arslanalp	and	Botman	(2015).		The	third	chapter	first	articulates	how	the	transmission	channels	of	QE	assume	an	exogenous	money	supply.	It	then	draws	on	the	work	of	Post-Keynesian	authors,	particularly	Lavoie	(2014,	2016)	and	Rochon	(2016)	as	well	as	dissident	central	banker	Koo	(2011)	who	criticize	the	bank	funding	channel	of	QE	by	reframing	it	within	an	endogenous	money	model.	This	chapter	then	extends	this	line	of	argument	to	cover	the	portfolio	balancing	channel,	adopting	for	this	aim	a	specifically	structuralist	understanding	of	endogenous	money	as	articulated	by	Lucarelli	(2013).	The	goal	of	this	chapter	is	to	establish	how	liquidity	preference	disrupts	the	transmission	mechanism	at	the	level	of	macroeconomic	abstraction	before	turning	to	specific	structural	features	of	Japanese	economic	development	in	the	following	chapter	in	order	to	establish	why	corporate	liquidity	preference	in	Japan	specifically	is	so	high.		In	order	to	articulate	this	Japan	specific	framework,	chapter	4	draws	on	the	capitalist	developmental	state	(CDS)	literature,	particularly	the	work	of	its	originator	Chalmers	Johnson	(1982,	1995)	as	well	the	most	prominent	scholar	in	this	area	aside	from	Johnson	–	Woo-Cummings	(1999).	Although	the	CDS	literature	has	primarily	been	used	a	theory	of	the	state’s	role	in	the	economy	this	chapter	uses	this	literature	to	identify	three	essential	features	of	firms	under	Japan’s	developmental	model:	long-term	orientation,	managerial	autonomy	and	role	as	social	welfare	provider.	This	is	order	that	these	structural	insights	may	be	separated	(as	much	as	possible)	from	this	literature’s	pro-developmental	normative	orientation	in	order	to	explore	how	these	features	that	once	enabled	export	led	growth	in	Japan	have	now	institutionalized	liquidity	preference	as	a	‘rational’	choice	for	firms	in	Japan’s	contemporary	context	of	secular	stagnation.	This	argument	draws	especially	on	Lucarelli’s	(2015)	insights	regarding	excess	capacity	investments	as	‘sunk	costs’	in	Japan.		Chapter	5	presents	the	combination	of	Post-Keynesian	contributions	regarding	QE	under	an	endogenous	money	paradigm	from	chapter	3	with	the	structuralist	insights	
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regarding	the	legacy	of	Japan’s	developmental	model	from	chapter	4,	in	order	to	posit	a	form	of	path-dependent	liquidity	preference	specific	to	the	contemporary	Japanese	context.	This	chapter	first	offers	some	preliminary	suggestions	on	how	this	path-dependent	iteration	of	liquidity	preference	could	be	integrated	into	the	previously	established	canon	of	liquidity	preference	theory	by	drawing	on	Post-Keynesian	authors	such	as	Robinson	(1980)	and	Davidson	(2009)	who	articulate	historical	time	as	essential	to	understanding	how	liquidity	preference	effects	investment	decisions.	It	also	offers	a	brief	discussion	of	how	structural	factors	could	be	understood	within	Keynes’s	(2008)	original	formulation	of	Money	Demand	as	presented	in	The	General	Theory.		This	chapter	then	outlines	the	role	this	path-dependent	liquidity	preference	has	played	in	disrupting	the	transmission	mechanism	of	QE	in	Japan.	This	is	followed	a	brief	conclusion,	summarizing	these	arguments.	QE	has	become	a	policy	issue	of	global	significance,	as	policy	makers	continue	to	combat	the	fallout	from	the	2008-9	global	financial	crisis	they	are	increasingly	taking	a	policy	developed	for	use	in	a	crisis	–	QE,	and	retro-fitting	into	an	improvised	anti-stagnation	policy.	Japan’s	experience	may	be	illustrative,	both	as	an	economy	that	has	been	stagnant	for	almost	three	decades	and	as	economy	committed	to	pursuing	QE	on	a	level	no	other	major	developed	economy	has	yet	attempted	(its	second	attempt	at	QE,	the	first	being	in	2001-6).	Indeed,	it	has	been	suggested	that	Japan’s	long	stagnation,	rather	than	disqualifying	it	as	legitimate	object	of	study,	could	make	it	a	useful	cautionary	tale	for	other	developed	economies,	hence	the	title	of	Wakatabe’s	2015	book:	Japan’s	Great	Stagnation	and	Abenomics:	Lessons	for	the	World.	However,	this	project	is	not	designed	primarily	as	investigation	of	the	broader	policy	implications	of	QE	and	does	not	suggest	alternative	monetary	policy	options.	Instead	the	goal	of	this	project	is	to	develop	a	more	thorough	understanding	of	how	the	transmission	mechanisms	of	QE	have	operated	in	the	reality	of	the	Japanese	context.	In	doing	so	the	hope	is	that	this	project	may	demonstrate	that	the	Japanese	context	provides	fertile	ground	for	combinations	of	Post-Keynesian	and	structuralist	understandings	of	the	interaction	between	liquidity	preference	and	monetary	policy,	arguing	that	the	simultaneous	application	of	these	two	lenses	creates	a	clearer	picture	of	the	Japanese	economy	than	either	is	able	to	alone.	Indeed,	this	project	is	not	the	first	to	combine	insights	from	the	CDS	literature	into	a	more	generally	Post-Keynesian	framework	and	then	apply	this	to	a	discussion	of	Japan.	Lucarelli	(2011)	incorporated	Johnson’s	ideas	
	 11	
regarding	Japan’s	export	led	growth	model	in	his	assessment	of	Japan’	secular	stagnation	as	an	example	of	a	Minksy-Fischer	debt	deflation	cycle.	This	project	seeks	to	build	on	Lucarelli’s	contribution	by	applying	the	same	combination	of	approaches	(the	CDS	literatures	historical	insights	and	Post-Keynesian	macro-economic	theory)	once	again	to	the	Japanese	case	study	though	this	time	to	issues	of	monetary	policy	transmission	mechanisms.		Before	commencing	the	body	of	the	project	proper	it	is	necessary	here	to	outline	two	aspects	of	the	Japanese	context	that	will	not	be	addressed	in	this	work	and	offer	a	brief	explanation	as	to	why.	This	project	will	not	substantially	discuss	the	government	fiscal	stimulus	programs	that	have	run	simultaneous	to	the	BoJ’s	QE	program.	This	because	the	logic	of	QE	transmission	mechanisms	assume	it	will	function	without	fiscal	assistance	and	so	to	address	QE	on	its	own	terms	requires	addressing	it	in	isolation.	However,	the	interlinkages	between	the	fiscal	and	monetary	aspects	of	Abenomics	may	be	a	fruitful	territory	for	future	research	in	this	area.	This	project	will	also	not	discuss	the	phenomenon	of	Japan’s	aging	population.	This	is	because	there	has	been	an	unfortunate	tendency	in	discussion	of	Japan	for	the	ageing	population	to	become	a	black	box,	into	which	all	the	failures	of	the	Japanese	economy	are	thrown,	preventing	further	investigation.	While	the	effect	of	the	ageing	population	on	monetary	policy	implementation	may	also	be	a	possible	avenue	for	future	research	in	this	area,	the	goal	of	this	project	was	understand	the	legacy	of	Japan’s	developmental	model	on	monetary	policy	rather	than	its	future	consequences.						 	
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Chapter	1	
	
Quantitative	Easing:		
Transmission	Mechanisms	and	Underlying	Logic			 Any	analysis	of	QE’s	relative	success	or	failure	in	the	Japanese	context	must	begin	with	the	broader	question:	what	is	QE?	Like	most	monetary	policies	QE	does	not	have	a	neat	line	of	conception	from	economic	principles	to	policy	implementation.	Instead	it	is	a	name	given	to	raft	of	central	bank	measures	whose	underlying	logic	is	a	mix	of	neo-classical	orthodoxy	and	the	practical	logic	of	central	banks	responding	to	periodic	crises.	However,	there	is	a	basic	logical	sequence	underlying	QE	that	can	be	separated	into	two	distinct	transmission	channels	relying	on	two	distinct	mechanisms,	
the	portfolio	balancing	mechanism	and	the	money	multiplier	respectively.	Despite	the	fact	that	central	bank	policy	making	is	often	more	pragmatic	then	dogmatic,	it	is	possible	to	trace	back	the	role	these	mechanisms	play	within	the	overall	logic	of	QE	to	a	set	of	basically	neo-classical	assumptions.	The	goal	of	this	chapter	is	to	give	a	clear	and	fair	account	of	the	two	key	transmission	mechanisms	associated	with	QE	in	order	to	demonstrate	that	they	both	rest	on	the	fundamental	assumption	that	firms	are	profit	motivated	rational	actors.	The	success	or	failure	of	these	programs	(which	will	be	discussed	in	detail	chapter	two)	therefore	necessitates	questioning	not	only	the	mechanical	aspects	of	QE	as	a	policy	but	also	those	assumptions	that	underlie	its	basic	design.		The	content	of	this	chapter	draws	on	the	work	of	Goodhart,	whose	writing	in	this	area	has	been	especially	useful	to	this	project	because	he	is	in	the	unusual	position	of	being	both	a	central	banker	trained	in	the	mainstream	tradition	and	a	strong	critic	of	QE	based	on	his	own	and	other’s	econometric	assessments.	On	the	Japanese	side	this	chapter	draws	primarily	from	Wakatabe	(2015)	who,	though	a	supporter	of	the	‘Abenomics’	program,	does	attempt	to	both	elucidate	the	logic	QE	(see	2015:	119)	and	address	common	criticisms	(see	2015:	123).	As	this	choice	of	materials	demonstrates	the	primary	point	of	comparison	here	when	discussing	QE	generally	will	be	between	the	Bank	of	England	(BoE)	and	the	BoJ.	This	is	because	the	implementation	of	QE	in	these	two	countries	has	taken	the	most	similar	form,	gilt	(UK	treasury	bond)	purchases	in	the	UK	and	Japanese	government	bond	(JGB)	purchases	in	Japan.	The	generic	model	
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developed	here	for	the	primary	and	secondary	transmission	mechanisms	of	QE	as	monetary	policy	in	the	abstract	will	therefore	be	most	applicable	to	these	two	cases	though	is	it	also	comparable	to	Fed	programs.	This	chapter	excludes	any	discussion	of	the	ECB	QE	program	as	it	involves	long-term	refinancing	operations	(LTROs),	essentially	direct	loans	from	the	central	bank	to	private	banks.	Although	LTROs	also	constitute	monetary	base	expansion	and	are	therefore	often	classed	as	a	type	of	QE	they	rely	on	a	somewhat	different	transmission	mechanism	that	would	be	distraction	from	the	story	here.	Section	1.1	of	this	chapter	briefly	introduces	the	financial	asset	types	central	to	QE	before	section	1.2	discusses	the	logic	of	the	portfolio	substitution	channel	and	section	1.3	does	the	same	for	the	bank	funding	channel.	Section	1.4	then	discusses	the	role	played	by	currency	devaluation	and	inflation	targets	in	the	Japanese	iteration	of	QE.	Section	1.5	concludes	by	arguing	that	these	transmission	channels	all	fundamentally	operate	under	the	assumption	of	a	rational	actor,	profit	motivated	in	the	short	term	before	explaining	why	the	rejection	of	this	assumption	will	inform	the	search	for	alternatives	presented	in	this	project.			
1.1	A	note	on	asset	types			As	QE	relies	on	the	assumption	that	agents	will	sell	bonds	and	buy	equities	it	is	worth	a	brief	digression	here	in	order	to	explain	the	difference	between	these	financial	assets.	A	bond	is	an	asset	which	is	essentially	a	debt	obligation	owed	by	the	bond	issuer	to	be	payed	of	at	fixed	point	in	the	future	(the	maturity)	as	well	as	semi-annual	interest	payments	over	the	life	of	the	bond	which	are	known	as	‘coupon	payments’	(Bodie,	Kane	&	Marcus,	2013:	31).	For	governments	such	as	that	of	Japan	whose	debt	is	primarily	internally	structured	(not	owed	to	foreign	creditors)	bond	issuance	is	the	primary	means	by	which	these	governments	finance	their	debt.	The	kind	of	bonds	being	discussed	in	this	project	are	generally	considered	to	be	safe	assets	as	they	provide	a	fixed	income	over	a	long	period	and	as	they	are	usually	issued	by	governments	or	large	corporations	there	is	very	little	default	risk,	although	corporate	bonds	are	considered	to	have	a	higher	default	risk	than	government	bonds	(Bodie,	Kane	&	Marcus,	2013:	31).	Bonds	generally	have	long	maturities	and	are	denominated	in	large	amounts,	for	example:	U.S	Treasury	bonds	have	maturities	of	between	10	and	30	years	and	the	individual	bond	notes	‘commonly	trade	in	denominations	of	$1000’	(Bodie,	Kane	&	
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Marcus,	2013:	31).	For	this	reason,	bonds	are	primarily	purchased	by	institutional	investors	such	as	banks,	firms	or	insurance	funds	rather	than	households,	as	these	institutions	can	afford	to	make	large	scale	investments	that	pay	out	over	a	longer	period.		Equites	are	the	asset	type	colloquially	referred	to	as	stocks,	essentially	a	stake	of	ownership	in	a	publically	listed	enterprise.	Rather	than	providing	coupon	payments	like	a	bond,	owners	of	equities	are	entitled	to	a	residual	-	a	‘claim	to	the	part	of	operating	income	left	after	interest	and	income	taxes	have	been	paid’	(Bodie,	Kane	&	Marcus,	2013:	38).	Equities	are	generally	considered	higher	risk	than	bonds	because	they	will	not	guarantee	the	owner	a	certain	profit,	instead	their	profitability	depends	on	the	income	of	the	firm	and	its	share	price.	Of	those	households	that	own	financial	assets	(which	is	by	no	means	the	majority)	equites	are	generally	the	asset	type	they	hold,	a	distinction	that	will	become	important	when	discussing	the	wealth	effect.	With	these	quick	and	rough	definitions	out	of	the	way	we	can	turn	to	the	transmission	mechanisms	of	QE	itself.			
1.2	The	portfolio	substitution	channel		For	the	first	transmission	mechanism	this	work	adopts	Goodhart	and	Ashworth’s	(2012:	662)	terminology	of	the	‘portfolio	substitution	channel’,	as	it	relies	on	the	existence	of	a	portfolio	rebalancing	mechanism.	A	neat	summary	of	this	channel’s	proposed	operation	comes	from	then	Deputy	Governor	of	the	BoE,	Charlie	Bean	(as	quoted	in	Goodhart	&	Ashworth	2012:	662)	who	explains	that	QE:	Essentially	involves	trading	one	liability	of	the	state—gilts—for	another—	monetary	claims	on	the	Bank	of	England.	We	aim	to	buy	mainly	from	non-bank	private	financial	institutions,	such	as	pension	funds	and	insurance	companies,	not	from	the	banks,	as	is	sometimes	erroneously	claimed.	When	we	buy	a	gilt,	we	simply	credit	the	bank	account	of	the	seller	with	an	appropriate	sum.	If	the	seller	were	indifferent	between	holding	the	gilt	and	holding	the	associated	bank	deposit,	that	is	where	things	would	stop.	But	because	deposits	tend	to	yield	less	than	gilts	and	assets	such	as	corporate	bonds	and	equities,	the	seller	is	likely	to	want	to	buy	some	other	asset	instead.	The	consequence	is	upward	pressure	on	
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the	prices	of	a	whole	range	of	assets,	including	corporate	bonds	and	equities.	That	increases	the	availability,	and	reduces	the	cost,	of	finance	to	corporates.	It	also	boosts	the	value	of	people’s	wealth,	which	should	encourage	more	spending.	Joyce	et	al	(2012:	279)	also	use	the	BoE	as	their	example	and	describe	the	mechanism	along	basically	similar	lines	explaining	that:		Investors	are	likely	to	use	some	of	the	proceeds	of	gilt	sales	to	purchase	other	long	-	dated	assets,	such	as	corporate	bonds,	to	restore	the	duration	of	their	portfolio…The	rise	in	asset	prices	and	decline	in	yields	on	these	other	assets	may	make	it	easier	for	many	companies	to	raise	funds,	easing	credit	conditions.	They	will	generate	capital	gains	for	households	who	are	the	ultimate	owners	of	those	risky	assets,	boosting	their	wealth.	If	households	consume	part	of	that	increased	wealth,	or	companies	invest	some	of	the	extra	funding	raised	on	capital	markets,	demand	(and	GDP)	will	be	higher.	Whilst	there	is	some	divergence	in	what	central	banks	actually	buy,	mortgage-backed	securities	in	the	case	of	the	Fed,	long	dated	gilts	for	the	BoE	and	shorter	dated	JGBs	for	the	BoJ	(Goodhart	&	Ashworth,	2012:	654),	all	central	banks	that	have	implemented	a	QE	program	have	followed	the	same	basic	logic.	Namely	that	replacing	safe	assets	on	private	sector	balance	sheets	with	central	bank	reserves	will	prompt	firms	and	non-bank	financial	institutions	to	jettison	these	low-interest	bearing	reserves	and	invest	in	riskier	assets	such	as	equities.	The	rising	yields	of	these	riskier	assets	will	then	allow	these	firms	and	non-bank	financial	institutions	access	to	cheaper	credit	which	can	finance	increased	investment.	Higher	equity	prices	will	also	increase	the	wealth	of	households	(who	disproportionately	hold	equities)	thus	increasing	household	spending	via	the	so-called	wealth	effect,	the	idea	that	investors	will	be	more	comfortable	to	spend	if	the	value	of	their	portfolios	increases.	This	new	spending	will	raise	domestic	demand	and	subsequently	GDP	growth.	Based	on	the	flow	chart	of	both	QE	transmission	mechanisms	produced	by	the	BoE	(as	reproduced	in	Goodhart	&	Ashworth,	2012:	662	and	Joyce	et	al,	2012:	278)	as	well	as	a	similar	flow	chart	from	the	BoJ	(as	reproduced	in	Wakatabe,	2015:	121)	presented	here	is	a	simplified	schematic	for	the	portfolio	substitution	channel	in	the	abstract	(see	fig.1.1).	This	figure	demonstrates	the	causality	of	QE	running	from	the	expansion	of	the	central	bank’s	balance	sheet	on	the	right,	to	the	
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growth	of	domestic	demand	on	the	left.	The	top	track	shows	the	casual	effect	of	rising	equity	prices	running	from	portfolio	balancing,	to	houses	increasing	their	spending	because	of	the	wealth	effect.	The	bottom	track	shows	the	effect	of	easing	access	to	credit	on	private	markets,	promoting	firms	to	stimulate	demand	through	new	investments.	
	
Figure	1.1	The	Portfolio	Substitution	Channel	This	mechanism	is	generally	assumed	to	be	the	primary	channel	for	the	operation	of	QE,	and	much	of	QE’s	success	or	failure	rests	on	whether	this	portfolio	rebalancing	behavior	occurs	or	not.	However,	it	is	not	the	only	mechanism	of	action	for	QE	as	there	is	also	what	Goodhart	and	Ashworth	(2012)	refer	to	as	the	‘bank	funding	channel’.			
1.3	The	bank	funding	channel	This	secondary	transmission	mechanism	follows	basically	the	same	sequential	logic	as	the	portfolio	substitution	channel,	simply	with	firms	and	non-bank	institutions	replaced	with	private	banks.	Former	BoE	Monetary	Policy	Committee	member	David	Miles	(as	quoted	in	Goodhart	&	Ashworth,	2012:	666)	described	this	channel	in	a	2011	Speech	to	the	Royal	Economic	Society,	there	he	explained	that:		When	the	Bank	of	England	purchases	gilts	owned	by	non-banks,	all	else	equal,	banks’	deposits	rise	as	do	reserve	balances	at	the	central	bank.	To	the	extent	that	a	bank’s	reserve	holdings	would	then	come	to	exceed	its	demand	for	liquidity,	it	is	likely	to	be	more	willing	to	expand	lending.	The	basic	logic	of	this	mechanism	is	that	during	QE	operations,	the	sellers	of	
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government	bonds	(firms)	deposit	the	proceeds	of	these	sales	(central	bank	reserves)	into	their	accounts	in	private	banks.	These	banks	can	then	make	new	loans	against	the	value	of	these	reserves	(Lavoie,	2016:	68).	The	assumption	that	increasing	the	reserve	position	of	private	banks	will	prompt	them	to	lend	relies	on	a	specific	interpretation	of	the	relationship	between	central	bank	money	and	private	bank	money	-	that	of	the	so	called	money	multiplier.	This	is	the	belief	that	the	more	the	central	bank	expands	the	monetary	base	beyond	the	reserve	requirements	and	liquidity	preferences	of	private	banks,	the	easier	it	will	be	for	banks	to	extend	private	lines	of	credit,	thus	increasing	the	overall	size	of	the	money	supply.	Presented	here	is	a	simplified	flow	chart	for	this	bank	funding	channel	as	described	above.	This	figure	demonstrates	the	causal	sequence	which	is	meant	to	underlie	the	operation	the	money	multiplier,	from	central	bank	balance	sheet	expansion	on	the	right,	to	the	increase	on	private	lending	on	the	left.		
Figure	1.2	The	Bank	Funding	Channel	Although	this	bank	funding	channel	is	a	component	part	of	QE	it	will	be	treated	as	a	secondary	concern	in	this	work	for	two	reasons.	The	first	is	that	the	bank	funding	channel	is	generally	considered	less	reliable	than	the	portfolio	substitution	channel	because	it	fundamentally	relies	on	the	liquidity	preference	of	private	banks.	David	Miles	explained	in	the	same	speech	referenced	above	(as	quoted	in	Goodhart	&	Ashworth,	2012:	666)	the	he	would	only	expect	the	bank	funding	channel	to	operate	‘under	conditions	of	stress	in	the	availability	of	funds	to	individual	banks’	as	‘the	more	concerned	banks	are	about	their	ability	to	re	finance	themselves,	the	less	likely	they	are	to	grant	loans.’	The	second	reason	is	that	for	the	specific	case	of	Japan	the	picture	is	complicated	by	a	historically	unusual	(from	a	western	perspective)	relationship	between	the	central	bank,	private	banks	and	the	largest	firms.	As	Johnson	(1999:	30-34)	explains,	the	Japanese	wartime	regime	‘rationalized	the	financial	system	by	its	authoritative	designation	of	banks	that	were	to	serve	particular	munitions	companies.’	
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This	set	the	template	for	Japan’s	wartime	zaibatsu	and	post	war	keiretsu,	financial	conglomerates	where	a	large	corporation	would	receive	financing	from	what	was	essentially	its	own	in	house	bank.	These	private	banks	were	in	turn	propped	up	by	BoJ	guarantees	in	order	to	support	‘over-lending’	(Johnson,	1990:	34).	This	system	has	since	been	largely	brought	in	line	with	other	developed	economies	as	a	consequence	of	global	capital’s	deregulation	and	internationalization	since	the	1980s.	As	Lucarelli	(2015:	314)	explains,	large	keiretsu’s	dependence	on	‘big	banks’	to	generate	funds	has	fallen	from	approximately	40%	in	the	early	1970s	to	only	6%	in	modern	Japan.	However,	the	structural	legacies	of	this	system	remain	part	of	the	Japanese	financial	landscape,	for	example:	The	Banker,	reported	that	Japan’s	largest	bank	by	tier	1	capital	as	of	2014	was	still	Mitsubishi	UFJ	Financial	Group	-	the	banking	arm	of	the	larger	Mitsubishi	Group	
keiretsu	(‘The	Top	5	Banks	in	Japan’,	2017).	The	context	specific	differences	between	central	bank	to	private	bank	transmission	mechanisms	in	western	economies	versus	those	in	Japan	could	be	a	fruitful	area	for	future	research.	However,	for	the	purposes	of	this	narrative	this	is	largely	a	moot	point	as	the	BoJ	QE	program	has	largely	avoided	explicit	reliance	the	bank	funding	channel	and	instead	been	primarily	focused	on	raising,	demand	and	inflation	via	portfolio	rebalancing	(see	fig.	5-1	in	Wakatabe,	2015:	121).	However,	there	is	another	aspect	of	QE	that	demands	examination	in	the	Japanese	context	–	currency	devaluation	and	inflation.		
1.4	Currency	devaluation	and	price	inflation	A	third	effect	that	could	be	considered	a	form	of	transmission	mechanism	for	QE	is	currency	devaluation.	However,	across	the	logic	of	all	QE	programs	the	place	of	currency	devaluation	is	often	the	most	ambiguous	for	two	reasons.	The	first	is	that	the	political	acceptability	of	currency	devaluation	as	an	explicit	monetary	policy	varies	widely	from	country	to	country.	As	Goodhart	&	Ashworth	(2012;	667)	explain:	‘The	effect	of	UK	QE	on	sterling	has	had	little	attention	in	BoE	empirical	exercises,	perhaps	reflecting	a	desire	to	avoid	accusations	they	may	be	engaging	in	“beggar	thy	neighbor”	policies.’	In	Japan	however,	currency	devaluation	was	always	an	explicit	feature	of	the	BoJ’s	proposed	transmission	mechanism.	This	is	primarily	because	of	Japan’s	specific	context	of	deflation	and	an	overvalued	Yen.	As	Wakatabe	(2015:	122)	explains:	‘The	flip	
	 19	
side	of	the	same	coin	of	Japan’s	persistent	deflation	was	the	appreciating	yen…therefore,	the	regime	change	in	monetary	policy	must	entail	the	breaking	of	the	so-called	ever-higher	yen	syndrome.’	This	explicit	aim	of	raising	inflation	is	also	in	and	of	itself	more	acceptable	as	component	of	QE	in	Japan	than	elsewhere.	Goodhart	(2013:	2),	again	taken	here	as	a	proxy	for	the	British	view,	describes	central	banks	using	monetary	policy	instruments	to	intentional	raise	inflation	as	‘inherently	dangerous’	as	it	may	erode	the	markets	confidence	in	the	future	value	of	money.	However,	for	the	BoJ	achieving	a	reflation	rate	of	2%	has	always	been	an	explicit	target.	Their	logic	is	that	the	public	commitment	to	this	target,	along	with	the	expansion	of	the	monetary	base,	will	raise	the	expected	inflation	rate,	leading	to	a	rise	in	the	real	interest	rate	which	will	devalue	the	currency	and	raise	asset	prices,	in	turn	closing	the	output	gap	and	thus	generating	price	inflation	(see	fig.	5-1	in	Wakatabe,	2015:	121).These	views	are	not	without	historical	precedent	in	Japan	as	much	of	the	countries’	post	war	development	was	premised	on	currency	devaluation	as	a	key	strategy	(Johnson,	1999:	34).	Indeed,	as	will	be	discussed	further	in	chapter	2,	currency	devaluation	has	been	one	of	the	only	consistent	effects	that	has	operated	basically	as	the	BoJ	intended	since	the	commencement	of	QE	in	2012.		There	is	also	a	second	reason	for	currency	devaluation’s	ambiguous	place	in	the	logic	of	QE	aside	from	its	sometimes	politically	taboo	nature.	Namely	that	any	benefit	of	a	falling	currency	has	the	ability	to	effectively	cancel	itself	out.	This	is	because	as	while	export	profits	grow,	unless	this	growth	is	accompanied	by	increased	domestic	investment	the	simultaneous	effect	of	imports	becoming	more	expensive	whilst	the	nominal	value	of	wages	falls	can	create	or	exacerbate	a	situation	in	which	inflation	outpaces	real	wage	growth.	This	has	already	been	the	case	in	the	UK	following	the	devaluation	of	the	Sterling	after	Brexit	(Allen,	2017).	Despite	very	low	inflation	in	Japan,	a	similar	effect	cannot	be	discounted	considering	that	Japan	is	net	importer	of	a	commodity	as	basic	as	food,	with	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	Forestry	and	Fisheries	sating	that	as	of	2006	domestic	production	only	covers	38%	of	Japan’s	food	sufficiency	requirement	as	measured	on	a	per	calorie	basis.	(Nagata,	2008)		
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1.5	Underlying	assumptions	Now	that	it	has	been	established	how	QE	is	supposed	to	operate	mechanically,	it	is	essential	to	point	out	that	each	of	these	mechanisms	rely	on	the	assumption	that	agents	will	behave	in	particular	and	predictable	ways.	If	we	return	to	the	speech	referenced	above	from	former	BoE	Deputy	Governor	Charlie	Bean	we	can	identify	a	particularly	telling	passage.	He	(as	quoted	in	Goodhart	&	Ashworth	2012:	662,	emphasis	added),	explains	of	QE	that:	‘If	the	seller	were	indifferent	between	holding	the	gilt	and	holding	the	associated	bank	deposit,	that	is	where	things	would	stop.’	What	Bean	is	freely	admitting	here	is	that	the	portfolio	substitution	channel	relies	on	the	belief	that	if	it	is	profitable	in	the	short	term	to	exchange	one	type	of	asset	for	another,	and	an	agent	has	the	ability	to	make	this	exchange,	this	is	what	the	agent	will	always	do.	In	other	words,	QE	assumes	a	rational,	profit	motivated	subject,	be	it	a	firm,	a	household,	a	private	financial	institution	or	a	bank.	This	means	that	if	the	results	of	QE	are	mixed	or	negative,	we	are	faced	with	one	of	two	scenarios.	The	first	is	one	in	which	the	underlying	assumption	of	a	rational	actor	is	correct,	but	there	is	some	aspect	of	the	mechanism	itself	that	is	not	taking	correct	advantage	of	this	rational	attitude.	The	majority	of	critiques	of	QE	from	mainstream	authors	have	been	along	these	lines.	For	example,	Eggertsson	and	Woodford	(2003:	160)	explicitly	rule	out	the	existence	of	a	
portfolio	balancing	mechanism	on	the	grounds	that:	‘changes	in	the	composition	of	the	securities	in	the	hands	of	the	public	do	not	change	the	state[context]-contingent	consumption	of	the	representative	household-this	depends	on	equilibrium	output.’	Joyce	et	al	(2012:	276)	summarize	Eggertsson	and	Woodfords	basic	position	as	one	in	which:	‘a	single	representative	agent	who	has	an	infinite	horizon,	faces	no	credit	restrictions	and	is	rational	–	sees	the	assets	held	by	the	government	and	by	the	central	bank	as	indistinguishable	from	their	own	assets.’	In	other	words,	if	QE	assumed	a	truly	rational	actor	then	the	portfolio	rebalancing	mechanism	would	not	operate	because	if	the	interest	rate	has	reached	the	zero	lower	bound	then	all	interest	bearing	assets	(gilts,	bonds,	etc)	are	of	equally	little	value	and	therefore	equivalent	to	cash	and	deposits.	This	line	of	criticism	contains	two	flaws	common	to	neo-classical	thinking.	The	first	is	that	it	remains	stubbornly	in	the	realm	of	the	abstract,	assuming	that	transmission	mechanisms	will	apply	evenly	to	all	contexts	and	ignoring	that	fact	that	even	the	most	basic	differences	between	national	approaches	to	QE	(purchasing	bonds	versus	
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securities	for	example)	demonstrate	the	highly	context	sensitive	nature	of	central	bank	policy	making.	The	second	is	that	this	line	of	argument	stays	so	firmly	within	the	realm	of	methodological	individualism	that	it	descends	into	a	quasi-theological	debate	over	who	has	the	purest	interpretation	of	rational	behavior.		Whilst	arguments	such	as	those	made	by	Eggertsson	and	Woodford	are	fair	when	considered	purely	within	the	remits	they	define	for	themselves	they	serve	as	a	means	of	justifying	why	empirical	evidence	diverges	from	the	model	precisely	so	that	the	assumptions	behind	the	model	need	not	be	questioned.	A	far	more	satisfying	approach	from	the	heterodox	perspective,	when	faced	with	a	failing	QE	program,	is	to	consider	a	second	scenario	-	one	in	which	it	is	not	merely	the	mechanical	aspects	of	QE	that	have	failed	but	the	assumptions	behind	them	that	may	be	faulty.	It	will	be	this	second	scenario	that	informs	the	explanations	put	forward	in	this	project.	The	following	chapter	will	address	the	empirical	evidence	for	QE’s	success	and	failure	before	focusing	in	on	the	related	phenomenon	of	surplus	hoarding	in	Japan.	However,	before	examining	this	empirical	literature	the	goal	here	has	been	to	demonstrate	that	the	mechanical	aspects	of	QE’s	transmission	channels	are	tied	so	closely	to	fundamentally	neo-classical	assumptions	regarding	firm	behaviour	that	any	empirical	observations	regarding	the	breakdown	of	the	former	necessitate	questioning	the	latter.	A	further	ancillary	to	assumptions	of	a	rational	actor	in	the	case	of	QE	is	another	assumption,	that	of	an	exogenous	money	supply.	Chapter	3	will	go	into	further	detail	on	this	assumption	in	the	discussion	of	Post-Keynesian	theories	of	endogenous	money	and	liquidity	preference.			 	
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Chapter	2	
	
Quantitative	Easing	in	Practice:		
Success,	Failure	and	Corporate	Surplus	Hoarding	
	 Now	that	it	has	been	established	how	QE	is	supposed	to	work	according	to	the	best	intentions	of	central	banks,	it	is	necessary	to	assess	how	closely	these	intentions	reflect	reality.	Section	2.1	of	this	chapter	places	the	relative	success	and	failure	of	Japan’s	QE	program	into	a	global	context	by	reviewing	empirical	literature	on	the	two	main	rounds	of	Fed	and	BoE	QE.	The	picture	here	is	generally	one	of	initially	positive	signs	followed	by	increasing	evidence	that	the	portfolio	rebalancing	mechanism	at	the	heart	of	QE	has	faltered.	This	pattern	of	positive	early	signs	followed	by	disappointment	repeats	itself	for	the	case	of	BoJ	QE,	discussed	in	section	2.2.	However,	here	the	story	here	is	further	complicated	by	the	significant	fall	of	the	Yen	and	the	real	interest	rate.	As	was	established	in	chapter	one,	the	basic	assumption	behind	the	portfolio	substitution	channel	of	QE	is	that	if	central	bank	reserves	appear	on	the	balance	sheets	of	private	firms,	those	firms	will	buy	equites.	Therefore,	any	discussion	of	the	empirical	evidence	of	QE’s	success	or	failure	in	Japan	cannot	be	concluded	without	addressing	the	mystery	at	the	heart	of	this	story;	namely	that	Japanese	firms	have	acted	exactly	contrary	to	this	assumption,	hoarding	assets	in	cash	and	deposits	on	an	unprecedented	scale.	Although	this	savings	trend	began	before	the	2012	BoJ	QE	program,	and	therefore	could	not	have	been	directly	caused	by	QE,	the	centrality	of	portfolio	rebalancing	to	QE’s	basic	logic	means	these	two	phenomena	cannot	be	understood	in	isolation	from	one	another.	For	this	reason,	section	3.2	is	dedicated	to	a	discussion	of	this	private	sector	surplus.	The	fact	that	this	surplus	hoarding	is	so	far	ahead	of	equivalent	trends	in	the	US	and	Europe	(Wolf:	2015)	also	establishes	the	need	for	a	Japan-specific	frame	of	analysis,	specifically	an	alternative	understanding	of	firm’s	motivation,	which	will	be	the	subject	of	chapter	4.	The	work	presented	here	once	again	draws	on	the	writing	of	Goodhart	and	Wakatabe	for	all	the	reasons	mentioned	in	the	previous	chapter,	however	now	added	to	this	list	is	University	of	Tokyo	professor	and	former	BoJ	policy	board	member	Kazuo	Ueda,	whose	observation	that	the	equity	price	bump	in	Japan	was	almost	entirely	due	to	foreign	firms,	was	the	initial	spark	that	ignited	this	authors	curiosity	about	QE	in	Japan.			
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2.1	The	global	context:	QE1	and	QE2	in	the	UK	and	US		The	basic	consensus	on	the	round	of	easing	that	immediately	followed	the	global	financial	crisis	of	2008-9,	often	referred	to	as	QE1,	was	that	initial	signs	were	positive.	In	their	extensive	survey	of	the	empirical	assessments	of	QE,	Joyce	et	al	(2012:	281)	explain	that:		In	2009,	the	timing	of	credit	and	QE	policies	coincided	with	a	rally	in	asset	prices,	with	equities	rising	sharply	and	government	and	corporate	bond	yields	showing	large	falls…Capital	market	borrowing	conditions	improved	in	the	UK	where	there	was	a	sharp	rise	in	both	corporate	bond	and	equity	issuance	during	2009.	The	fact	that	bond	yields	fell	and	equity	prices	rose,	easing	access	to	credit	on	private	markets,	would	indicate	that	at,	at	least	at	first,	the	portfolio	substitution	channel	was	operating	as	intended.	Goodhart	(2013:	4)	concurs,	writing	that:	‘expansionary	measures	did	lead	to	higher	output	(and	inflation)	than	would	otherwise	have	occurred,	especially	QE1	in	both	the	USA	and	UK.’	In	fact,	Goodhart	and	Ashworth	(2012:	642)	argue	that	because	dynamic	stochastic	general	equilibrium	models	assume	no	risk	of	default	‘focusing	solely	on	long-term	public-sector	debt’	may	have	caused	standard	empirical	studies	to	have	underestimated	QE1’s	effect	on	lowering	risk	premia.	However,	easing	access	to	private	credit	by	lowering	risk	premia	is	only	one	ancillary	aspect	of	the	portfolio	substitution	channel.	When	it	comes	to	the	longer	term	evidence	for	the	functioning	of	the	portfolio	rebalancing	mechanism	itself	signs	are	considerably	less	encouraging.		Despite	their	enthusiasm	for	early	signs	of	QE’s	success	Joyce	et	al	(2012:	281)	still	note	that:	‘subsequent	recovery	has	been	sluggish	and	much	weaker	than	after	a	normal	cyclical	downturn.’	Based	on	their	own	event	study	analysis	of	BoE	QE,	Goodhart	and	Ashworth	(2012:	665,	emphasis	in	original)	concluded	that:	‘the	data	do	not	suggest	that	QE	has	been	fueling	a	significant	across	the	board	switch	out	of	gilts	and	into	riskier	domestic	assets	by	non-bank	financial	institutions.’	A	particularly	salient	point	from	their	analysis	was	the	observation	of	the	difference	between	QE1	and	QE2,	where	they	(2012:	665)	observed	that	‘what	is	strikingly	apparent	is	the	lack	of	impact	of	QE2	on	equities’	going	on	to	conclude	that	‘given	that	direct	holdings	of	corporate	bonds	among	households	are	significantly	less	than	those	of	equities,	one	
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suspects	the	‘wealth	effects’	boost	from	portfolio	rebalancing	during	QE2	are	limited.’	This	point	regarding	households	is	crucial.	As	discussed	in	chapter	one,	households	are	much	more	likely	to	hold	equities	than	bonds.	This	means	that	any	possible	wealth	
effect,	where	the	increasingly	value	of	household	stock	portfolio’s	makes	them	more	confident	to	spend,	relies	on	equities	specifically	being	the	asset	that	rises	in	price.	While	the	prices	of	short	dated	corporate	bonds	rising	may	ease	access	to	credit	on	private	markets	this	is	an	inferior	route	to	boosting	domestic	demand	compared	to	the	
wealth	effect	because	it	relies	on	the	assumption	that	firms	will	want	to	borrow	to	raise	wages	or	make	capital	investments.	This	in	turn	is	a	questionable	assumption	seeing	as	firms	seem	not	even	to	be	willing	to	take	the	risk	on	equites	in	the	first	place.	The	following	chapter	will	offer	some	explanation	as	to	why	the	effect	QE2	on	equites	was	weaker	than	that	of	QE1	via	a	discussion	of	endogenous	money	and	liquidity	preference.	However,	suffice	to	say	here	that	this	stalling	of	the	portfolio	rebalancing	mechanism	between	the	two	cases	demonstrates	how	crucially	important	the	relative	demand	for	money	is	in	QE	implementation.		The	story	becomes	even	grimmer	for	the	bank	funding	channel	of	QE.	For	the	2008-9	period	in	the	UK	a	371%	increase	in	central	bank	reserves	led	to	only	a	1%	increase	in	private	bank	lending	to	non-financial	corporations	and	the	household	sector,	while	in	the	US	a	1853%	increase	in	central	banks	reserves	led	to	only	a	4%	increase	in	lending	to	these	sectors	(Goodhart	and	Ashworth	2012:	651).	Suffice	to	say	these	are	not	encouraging	numbers.	However,	it	is	important	to	remember,	as	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	that	the	bank	funding	channel	is	not	expected	to	operate	all	the	time.	As	Arslanalp	and	Botman	(2015:	5)	explain:	‘a	‘bank	lending	channel,’…will	depend	critically	on	economic	conditions,	both	on	the	take-up	side	of	new	loans	as	well	as	the	extent	to	which	banks	need	to	deleverage.’	Therefore,	it	is	necessary	to	return	to	the	primary	story,	the	breakdown	of	the	portfolio	rebalancing	channel	and	specifically	the	scale	of	the	challenges	it	has	faced	in	the	case	of	Japan.			
2.2	QE	in	Japan	Before	addressing	the	success	or	failure	of	QE	in	Japan	it	is	important	simply	to	note	the	sheer	scale	of	the	BoJ’s	easing	operations.	As	of	2014	the	BoJ	was	aiming	to	
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double	the	monetary	base	to	reach	the	equivalent	of	54%	of	Japan’s	GDP	(Arslanalp	&	Botman,	2015:	3).	As	of	May	this	year	(2017)	The	Nikkei	Asia	Review	reported	that	‘assets	owned	by	the	Bank	of	Japan	have	reached	the	equivalent	of	90%	of	the	country's	gross	domestic	product’	(‘BOJ	assets	swell	to	90%	of	Japan's	GDP’,	2017).	Arslanalp	and	Botman	(2015:	9,	emphasis	added)	argue	that	by	2018	‘the	BoJ’s	dominant	position	in	the	government	bond	market	will	be	unprecedented	among	major	advanced	economies.’	However,	despite	pursuing	easing	on	a	scale	no	other	central	bank	has,	the	BoJ’s	experience	has	nonetheless	mirrored	that	of	US	and	UK	QE	programs,	with	a	successful	start	running	into	diminishing	returns.	Headline	macroeconomic	indicators	were	full	of	positive	sings	for	QE	in	Japan	in	the	first	two	years	of	Abenomics.	Between	2012	and	2014	there	was	a	boost	in	the	value	of	Nikkei	index,	the	yen	depreciated,	unemployment	fell,	the	consumer	price	index	rose	and	even	GDP	briefly	turned	positive	(Wakatabe,	2015:	113).	However,	as	Wakatabe	(2015:	113-114)	explains:	Toward	the	summer	of	2014,	people	began	talking	about	Abenomics	being	in	trouble…The	annualized	real	growth	rates	for	the	second	and	the	third	quarters	turned	to	negative,	and	the	output	gap	widened	to	–	2.8	percent	of	Japan’s	GDP	in	the	third	quarter	of	2014.	Despite	a	second	round	of	BoJ	easing	beginning	in	2014,	the	all-important	reflation	target	has	remained	elusive	with	inflation	as	measured	by	annual	percentage	change	in	the	consumer	price	index	returning	to	its	downward	trend	since	2014	(see	fig	2.1).		
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Figure	2.1	Japan	consumer	price	index	%	annual	change	(source:	The	World	Bank	Data)	While	GDP	growth	bounced	back	somewhat	from	the	2014	lull	it	remains	low,	hovering	around	the	1%	mark	since	2014	(see	fig	2.2)	and	what	growth	there	is	certainly	cannot	be	neatly	attributed	to	the	effects	of	QE	beyond	higher	export	profits	owing	to	the	devalued	Yen.	
	
Figure	2.2	GDP	growth	%	annual	change	(source:	The	World	Bank	Data)	
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Worse	still	for	BoJ	QE	is	that	much	like	QE	in	the	UK,	the	bank	funding	channel	has	largely	failed	to	operate.	Arslanalp	and	Botman	(2015:	7)	explain	that	despite	that	fact	that	in	Japan	private	banks	sold	‘about	¥30	trillion	of	JGBs	between	March	2013	and	September	2014’	private	bank	lending	has	not	seen	a	significant	acceleration,	only	‘rising	by	2	percent	for	major	banks	and	4	percent	for	regional	banks	by	end-2014.’	Strangely,	this	disappointing	lack	of	serious	reflation,	GDP	growth	or	increasing	private	lending	has	been	despite	the	fact	that	the	real	interest	rate	(the	lending	rate	adjusted	for	inflation	as	measured	by	the	GDP	deflator)	was	falling	in	Japan	between	2010	and	2015	(see	fig	2.3).		
	
Figure	2.3	Japan	real	interest	rate	(Source:	The	World	Bank	Data)	According	to	Wakatabe	this	should	be	activating	the	portfolio	rebalancing	mechanism.	He	explains	(2015:	120)	that	the	BoJ’s	logic	‘could	be	considered	a	big	domino	game.	The	key	starting	point	is	the	increase	in	the	expected	inflation	rate.’	This	supposedly	then	leads	on	to	a	rise	in	the	real	interest	rate	which	in	turn	‘would	translate	into	an	improvement	in	the	discounted	present	value	of	the	corporate	earnings	in	the	future,	which	leads	to	an	increase	in	stock	prices	in	the	present.’	If	we	are	to	follow	this	metaphor	of	a	domino	game,	why	is	it	that	only	the	second	domino,	the	real	interest	rate,	that	actually	fell?	It	seems	as	though,	much	as	in	the	UK,	base	money	expansion	has	managed	promote	some	purchases	of	short	term	corporate	bonds	thus	lowering	term	premia	in	Japan	and	hence	interest	rates.	However,	this	has	happened	without	the	
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actual	portfolio	rebalancing	mechanism	kicking	in	any	substantive	way.	To	understand	why	what	initially	seemed	to	be	a	successful	implementation	of	the	portfolio	substitution	channel	ended	in	such	disappointment	requires	going	beyond	headline	indicators	and	investigating	the	split	in	behavior	between	domestic	and	foreign	firms	in	Japan	during	the	implementation	of	QE.		University	of	Tokyo	professor	and	former	BoJ	policy	board	member	Kazuo	Ueda	observed	that	while	equities	received	an	initial	boost	after	the	BoJ’s	JGB	buying	operations	began	in	2012	there	was	actually	a	serious	imbalance	within	the	market.	Put	simply	domestic	firms	were	doing	the	selling	and	foreign	were	firms	doing	the	buying.	He	writes	(2013:	262)	that:		The	most	noteworthy	feature	of	trading	in	this	period	has	been	the	dominance	of	foreign	investors	in	the	currency	and	stock	markets…	Japanese	players	have	mostly	stayed	on	the	sidelines	in	these	markets.	In	contrast,	the	JGB	market	has	been	dominated	by	domestic	financial	institutions.	Figure	2.4	is	reproduced	from	Ueda	(2013:	262)	and	shows	the	net	purchases	of	Japanese	stocks	by	foreigners,	and	Japanese	individual,	nonfinancial	and	financial	buyers	during	this	initial	equity	price	bump	in	the	early	period	of	Abenomics	(November	2012	to	April	2013).	Note	that	foreign	investors’	purchases	far	exceed	those	of	the	three	domestic	groups.	
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Fig.	2.4	Net	purchases	of	Japanese	stocks	(reproduced	from:	Ueda,	2013:	262)	The	consequence	of	this	split	in	domestic	and	foreign	firm	behavior	meant	that	from	the	outside	it	seemed	as	though	(at	least	initially)	QE	was	working	as	intended.	An	illusion	that	was	enhanced	by	the	fact	that	stock	prices	rose	as	companies’	export	profits	grew	on	the	back	a	depreciating	Yen	(Aslanalp	and	Botman	2015:	8).	However,	in	reality	what	appeared	on	the	surface	to	be	portfolio	rebalancing	–	JGBs	being	sold	and	equities	being	bought	–	was	actually	not	due	to	portfolio	rebalancing	on	the	balance	sheets	of	individual	banks	or	firms	but	rather	the	actions	of	basically	separate	groups	of	buyers	and	sellers	(Ueda,	2013:	263).	It	here	that	the	global	context	introduced	earlier	becomes	particularly	relevant.	As	Ueda	(2013:	253)	explains:		The	behavior	of	foreign	investors	seems	to	have	been	based	on	the	view	that	the	aggressive	use	of	nonconventional	monetary	policy	(NCM),	even	if	it	does	not	lead	to	improvements	in	the	real	side	of	the	economy,	is	capable	of	raising	asset	prices.	The	view	must	have	been	based	on	investors’	experience	with	the	easing	carried	out	by	global	central	banks.	The	implication	here,	is	that	not	only	was	the	pattern	of	Fed	and	BoE	QE	generally	repeating	itself	in	Japan,	but	that	the	encouraging	initial	rash	of	equity	purchases	in	Japan	was	possibly	being	led	by	the	exact	same	investors	that	had	experienced	the	initial	surge	of	QE1	in	the	US	and	UK.	This	would	go	some	way	to	explain	why	the	
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failures	of	QE	have	followed	such	a	similar	pattern	inside	and	outside	Japan.	In	both	cases	some	aspects	of	the	portfolio	substitution	channel	have	operated,	corporate	bond	purchases	lowering	term	premia	in	the	UK,	currency	devaluation	and	a	lower	real	interest	rate	in	Japan.	However,	in	both	cases	the	actual	portfolio	rebalancing	
mechanism	has	basically	failed	to	kick	in.	The	question	then	remains,	if	Japanese	firms	were	happy	to	sell	their	JGBs	but	did	not	subsequently	purchase	equities	on	any	significant	scale,	what	have	they	done	with	the	huge	quantities	of	central	bank	reserves	they	received	in	exchange?	Here	we	come	to	the	phenomena	central	to	the	dysfunction	of	QE’s	implementation	in	Japan	-	corporate	surplus	hoarding.		
2.3	The	corporate	surplus	in	Japan	The	pithy	answer	to	the	question	of	what	Japanese	firms	have	done	with	their	newly	acquired	central	banks	reserves,	as	well	their	increased	profits	on	the	back	of	a	weaker	yen	is	-	nothing.	With	Bloomberg	reporting	that	as	of	the	last	of	quarter	of	2015	‘Corporate	assets	in	cash	and	deposits	reached	a	record	high	of	246	trillion	yen	($2.2	trillion),	rising	for	the	29th	consecutive	quarter.’	(Fujioka,	2016).	This	trend	actually	began	before	the	introduction	of	QE	in	2012.	As	Fig	2.5	shows,	currency	and	deposit	holdings	beginning	to	rise	in	1998	and	accelerated	during	the	recovery	from	the	global	financial	crisis	after	2008.	
	
Figure	2.5	Currency	and	Deposit	holdings	(%	of	GDP)	(reproduced	from:	Kang,	2014:	6)	
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However,	increasing	cash	and	deposits	holdings	on	their	own	are	not	necessarily	a	sign	of	an	inactive	private	sector.	As	Kang	(2015:	6)	explains:	‘The	size	of	retained	earnings	does	not	provide	information	on	how	firms	have	allocated	their	resources	into	various	activities	including	investment	or	cash	holdings	since	it	does	not	include	information	on	debit	side	of	the	balance	sheet.’	This	the	raises	the	question,	is	corporate	spending	in	Japan	keeping	pace	with	savings?	The	short	answer	again	is	no.	Kang	(2015:	8)	explains	that	during	the	1980’s	boom	private	investment	accounted	for	more	than	a	third	of	Japan’s	growth,	however	since	the	1990s	private	non-residential	investment	has	fallen	significantly	‘from	around	20	percent	of	GDP	to	about	13½	percent	as	of	2013.’	This	trend	of	corporate	investment	falling	behind	corporate	savings	is	actually	a	phenomenon	occurring	across	developed	economies,	however	in	terms	of	scale	Japan	exceeds	other	high	income	countries.	Martin	Wolf	explains	in	the	Financial	Times	(2015)	that	whilst	‘Since	the	crisis,	the	corporate	sectors	of	the	big	high-income	economies	have	run	surpluses	of	savings	over	investment,	with	the	exception	of	France’	Japan	is	in	a	league	of	its	with	surplus	savings	‘close	to	8	percent	of	gross	domestic	product’		This	surplus	hoarding	behavior	of	Japanese	firms	is	an	interesting	phenomenon	in	and	of	itself	but	for	the	purposes	of	this	project	it	needs	to	be	investigated	because	it	is	acting	as	the	fundamental	blockage	in	the	QE	transmission	mechanism.	As	was	established	in	this	and	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	portfolio	rebalancing	mechanism	is	a)	the	effect	at	the	heart	of	QE’s	operational	logic	and	b)	the	mechanism	that	has	consistently	failed	to	operate	properly	both	in	the	global	context	and	in	Japan.	In	order	to	go	some	way	towards	understanding	how	this	surplus	hoarding	is	effecting	QE	in	Japan	and	why	firms	are	behaving	this	way	this	work	will	draw	on	two	separate	literatures.	The	next	chapter	introduces	Post-Keynesian	literature	regarding	liquidity	preference	in	a	system	of	endogenous	money.	The	goal	there	will	be	to	establish	an	understanding	of	how	firm’s	preference	for	liquid	assets	can	disrupt	central	bank	policy	measures	that	assume	an	exogenous	stock	of	money.	This	framework	will	be	necessary	to	understanding	how	liquidity	preference	can	disrupt	QE	at	the	level	of	abstract	macro-dynamics	but	is	not	sufficient	in	the	sense	that	it	does	not	explain	the	difference	in	the	scale	of	corporate	sector	savings	between	Japan	and	the	rest	of	the	developed	economies.	To	this	end	chapter	4	will	turn	to	the	capitalist	developmental	state	(CDS)	
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literature	in	order	to	establish	a	theory	of	the	firm	specific	to	the	path-developmental	features	of	the	Japanese	economy.			 	
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Chapter	3	
	
Endogenous	Money,	Liquidity	Preference	and	QE	in	Japan		The	previous	chapter	discussed	the	issue	that	a	monetary	expansion	of	unprecedented	scale	in	Japan	had	failed	to	make	a	dent	in	equally	unprecedented	levels	of	private	sector	saving.	The	sustained	expansion	of	central	bank	reserves	seems	to	have	been	met	with	an	equally	endless	preference	on	the	part	of	Japanese	firms	to	hold	assists	in	a	liquid	form.	Before	addressing	why	Japanese	firms	are	sitting	idly	on	so	much	money,	it	is	necessary	to	establish	why	liquidity	preference	generally	presents	a	problem	to	the	transmission	channels	of	QE.	To	this	end	this	chapter	will	draw	upon	the	Post-Keynesian	literature	that	detaches	QE	from	its	underlying	assumption	of	an	
exogenous	money	supply	and	instead	explains	its	failure	in	the	context	of	an	endogenous	money	framework.	The	arguments	presented	here	draw	on	the	work	of	Marc	Lavoie,	as	well	as	related	contributions	from	Louis-Phillipe	Rochon	and	the	dissenting	central	banker	Richard	Koo	as	these	authors	have	been	at	the	forefront	of	applying	an	endogenous	money	framework	to	the	case	of	QE.	Section	3.1	will	outline	their	critique,	which	is	aimed	chiefly	at	the	logic	of	the	money	multiplier	and	by	extension	the	bank	funding	channel	of	QE.		However,	this	chapter	will	argue	that	it	is	possible	extend	the	scope	of	their	criticisms	and	so	section	3.2	applies	this	endogenous	money	framework	to	the	failure	of	the	portfolio	rebalancing	mechanism.	The	goal	here	is	to	make	a	case	for	how	QE	could	fail	in	Japan	at	the	level	of	macroeconomic	abstraction	before	digging	into	the	structural	specificities	of	Japanese	firm’s	spending	behaviour.	The	contribution	of	these	structural	factors	is	briefly	prefaced	in	section	3.3	before	being	explored	in	detail	the	following	chapter.		
3.1	The	exogenous	money	assumption	-	QE	as	reversed	monetarism		Essential	to	the	belief	that	QE	will	be	effective	is	the	assumption	of	an	exogenously	given	money	supply.	This	is	the	theory	that	the	causal	vector	of	money’s	creation	sits	outside	of	interactions	between	economic	agents	in	the	money	market.	Instead	in	this	model	‘The	central	bank	controls	the	supply	of	reserves	(H),	and	can	thereby	determine	the	money	supply	(M)	and	nominal	income	(Y),	conditional	on	given	
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values	of	the	money	multiplier	(m)	and	the	velocity	of	money	(V)’	(Palley,	2013:	7).	This	money	supply	is	often	termed	‘vertical’	or	‘verticalist’	because	on	an	x-y	graph	with	the	money	supply	(M)	on	the	x-axis	and	nominal	income	(Y)	on	the	y-axis	the	line	representing	the	money	demand	schedule	would	be	vertical	(Palley,	2013:	7).	Figure	3.1	shows	a	simplified	version	of	this	vertical	money	supply	schedule	based	on	the	full	vertical	money	model	presented	in	Palley	(2013:	7).	
	
Figure	3.1	A	vertical	money	supply	schedule		The	line	here	is	vertical	because	with	the	money	supply	being	determined	outside	of	interactions	between	agents	in	the	money	market,	the	money	supply	schedule	is	independent	of	the	nominal	income	level	an	is	instead	being	determined	by	the	money	
multiplier	(m)	and	the	supply	of	high-powered	money	(H).	Under	this	model,	in	order	for	private	banks	to	lend	they	must	do	so	against	the	value	of	deposits.	This	in	turn	makes	the	central	bank	a	powerful	actor	because	the	relationship	between	central	reserves	and	private	banks	is	thought	to	be	governed	by	the	money	multiplier	effect	in	which	an	‘increase	in	[central	bank]	reserves	and	deposits	of	bank	customers	is	said	to	lead	to	a	nearly	automatic	multiple	increase	in	the	loans	and	deposits	of	banks	(Lavoie,	2016:	65).	The	assumed	mechanism	of	action	here	is	that	any	expansion	of	central	bank	reserves	onto	the	balance	sheets	of	private	banks	which	exceeds	these	bank’s	demand	for	liquid	assets	allows	these	banks	to	finance	increased	lending	against	the	value	of	
	 35	
these	reserves.	The	reason	an	exogenous	money	supply	becomes	an	essential	assumption	for	any	belief	in	efficacy	of	QE	operations	is	that,	as	discussed	in	chapter	one,	this	money	multiplier	effect	is	the	driving	mechanism	behind	QE’s	bank	funding	channel.	This	theoretical	reliance	on	the	existence	of	a	money	multiplier	prompts	Lavoie	(2016:	68)	to	characterize	QE	operations	as	essentially	reversed	monetarism.	He	writes	that:		 QE	is	effectively	just	the	‘‘child’’	of	monetarism,	but	in	reverse	gear.	Monetarism	claimed	to	be	able	to	rein	in	inflation	by	setting	money	supply	targets	and	restraining	the	creation	of	reserves;	mainstream	QE	advocates	allege	to	be	able	to	generate	price	inflation	by	inflating	the	balance	sheet	of	the	central	bank	and	creating	huge	excess	reserves.	In	other	words,	the	original	thinking	behind	monetarism,	that	reigning	in	the	money	supply	would	reduce	inflation,	is	reversed	in	the	case	of	QE,	which	believes	that	expanding	the	money	supply	will	reflate	prices	by	increasing	spending	via	the	money	
multiplier	and	portfolio	rebalancing	mechanism.	This	is	especially	relevant	to	the	Japanese	case	where	reaching	the	2%	reflation	target	has	been	the	longstanding	goal	for	the	BoJ.		This	theoretical	reliance	on	an	exogenous	money	framework	to	justify	monetary	expansion	is	a	curious	development	in	contemporary	monetary	policy	making.	This	is	because	aside	from	QE,	the	global	financial	crisis	has	generated	some	questioning	of	exogenous	money	within	mainstream	literature	to	the	point	where	some	mainstream	models	now	incorporate	what	appears	to	be	an	at	least	a	partially	endogenous	money	supply	(Rochon,	2016:	92,	Palley,	2013:	10).	This	shift	in	thinking	would	also	seem	to	be	evidenced	by	growing	skepticism	in	central	banking	towards	the	old	idea	that	the	central	bank	can	simultaneously	set	a	positive	short-term	interest	rate	and	a	level	of	high-powered	money	(H)	and	have	these	be	independent	of	one	another	(see	for	example	Goodhart:	2013:	2-3).	In	fact,	as	far	back	as	2007	Wray	(17)	notes	that:	‘most	economists	now	recognize	that	the	central	bank	can	only	set	the	overnight	interest	rate—which	has	only	an	indirect	impact	on	the	quantity	of	reserves	and	the	quantity	of	privately	created	money.’	Recognizing	this	many	central	banks	have	adopted	a	‘floor	system’	in	which	the	bank	sets	a	‘lower	bound’	or	limit	on	the	interest	rate	by	which	it	is	
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profitable	for	private	banks	to	lend	to	one	another	other.	The	advantage	of	this	for	central	banks	has	been	that	‘the	target	interest	rate	can	be	modified	without	any	change	in	the	outstanding	amount	of	reserves’	(Lavoie,	2014:	224).	Japan	actually	adopted	this	system	in	1996,	even	earlier	than	the	US,	UK	and	EU	(Lavoie,	2014:	223).	This	presents	us	with	a	strange	paradox	in	the	logic	of	contemporary	central	banking.	On	one	hand	the	acknowledgement	that	central	banks	have	to	validate	their	choice	of	a	positive	interest	rate	by	accommodating	the	amount	of	reverses	that	households	and	private	banks	wish	to	hold	at	that	rate	(Goodhart,	2013:	2-3),	and	subsequent	adopting	of	a	floor	system	as	work	around	for	this,	would	seem	to	be	a	rejection	of	the	vertical	money	model.	However,	on	the	other	hand	QE	programs	are	premised	on	the	belief	in	the	multiplier	
effect,	and	this	multiplier	effect	is	itself	an	essential	component	of	the	exogenous	money	story.		 One	explanation	lies	with	central	banks	belief	that,	if	reveres	were	needed	to	accommodate	a	positive	interest	rate,	then	conversely	‘once	the	lower	nominal	bound	to	interest	rates	had	been	hit,	the	CB	could	now	choose	to	expand,	the	monetary	base,	as	much	as	it	might	wish’	(Goodhart,	2013:	3).	However,	this	seemingly	contradictory	belief	in	the	power	of	expansionary	monetary	policy	is	also	related	to	the	political	context	in	which	central	banks	operate.	With	more	than	thirty	years	of	neoclassical	orthodoxy	criticizing	fiscal	policy	in	favor	of	‘monetary	policy	dominance’	(Rochon,	2016:91),	QE	has	become	representative	of	what	Lavoie	(2014:	229)	characterizes	as	‘a	desperate	attempt	by	monetary	authorities	and	some	economists	still	adhering	to	monetarism	to	demonstrate	that	monetary	policy	is	always	effective.’	This	leads	us	to	the	question	of	whether	the	disappointments	of	QE	make	more	sense	in	the	context	of	an	endogenous	money	supply.	Here	it	is	necessary	to	take	a	brief	detour	into	the	endogeneity	of	money	and	reversed	causality,	before	applying	this	criticism	to	the	breakdown	of	the	bank	funding	channel.		
	
3.2	Endogenous	money	and	the	bank	funding	channel	The	key	difference	between	an	exogenous	and	an	endogenous	money	supply	is	that	in	the	endogenous	model	the	creation	of	money	occurs	within	the	money	market,	where	it	is	‘the	outcome	of	purposeful	interactions	between	economic	agents’	(Fontana,	
	 37	
2004:	367).	This	means	that	the	sequence	of	events	as	laid	out	in	the	exogenous	model,	where	households	or	the	central	bank	make	deposits	and	private	banks	then	loan	against	these	deposits,	is	now	reversed.	In	the	reversed	causality	of	the	endogenous	story	‘the	supply	of	money	is	determined	by	the	demand	for	credit	(bank	loans),	and	the	latter	originates	within	the	system	to	finance	the	production	process	or	the	upsurge	of	speculative	purchases’	(Fontana,	2004,	367	emphasis	added).	Lavoie’s	(2016:	65)	describes	this	reversed	causality	in	this	way:	‘It	is	not	the	deposits	of	the	economic	agents	that	allow	banks	to	make	more	credit;	it	is	the	decision	of	banks	to	grant	more	credit	that	leads	to	the	creation	of	money	deposits.’	This	model	is	referred	to	as	‘horizontal’	or	‘accommodationist’	because	in	this	reversal	of	the	verticalist	story	the	creation	of	reserves	by	the	central	banks	simply	accommodate	loans	already	made	by	private	banks.		Why	does	this	reversal	of	the	mainstream	story	potentially	invalidate	the	bank	funding	channel	of	QE?	Put	simply	this	is	because	there	is	no	reason	for	the	money	
multiplier	to	operate	within	this	framework.	As	Lavoie	(2014:	210,	emphasis	added)	explains:		In	the	post-Keynesian	view,	banks	provide	loans	first,	and	search	for	reserves	later.	Banks	do	not	wait	for	excess	reserves	to	be	provided	like	manna	from	heaven.	They	grant	loans	whenever	a	creditworthy	customer	shows	up	or	if	they	find	one.	It	follows	that,	when	banks	wind	up	with	excess	reserves,	they	have	
already	granted	all	the	loans	they	could	have	made.	Put	simply	banks	do	not	lend	against	the	value	of	the	reserves	they	hold	at	the	central	bank,	instead	they	lend	depending	on	whether	or	not	there	are	willing	borrowers	in	the	market	–	if	there	is	demand	for	loans.	Although	the	money	multiplier	has	failed	to	operate	in	the	case	of	BoE	and	Fed	QE,	this	lack	of	willing	borrowers	has	historically	been	particularly	crippling	in	Japan.	As	the	former	central	banker	Richard	Koo	(2011:75)	explains:	‘Anyone	working	in	the	financial	sector	is	well	aware	that	Japan	suffers	from	an	acute	shortage	of	borrowers.	This	is	why	interest	rates	have	been	so	low	for	so	long.’	As	established	in	chapter	2,	private	sector	saving	began	to	trend	upwards	in	Japan	in	1998	(see	fig.2.5)	after	firms	and	banks	began	to	deleverage	from	their	heavily	indebted	position	following	the	Japanese	housing	bubble	and	the	subsequent	Asian	
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financial	crisis.	It	is	then	no	surprise	then	that	when	the	BoJ	conducted	its	first	QE	program	from	2001-2006,	although	base	money	expanded,	the	overall	money	supply	did	not.	As	Koo	(2011:	74)	explains:	‘The	increased	availability	of	reserves	was	totally	irrelevant	to	growth	in	money	supply	because	the	banking	system	was	awash	in	excess	reserves	long	before	quantitative	easing	began.’	As	discussed	in	chapter	two,	this	trend	in	private	sector	saving	has	since	continued	practically	unabated.		This	endogenous	money	framework	can	then	perhaps	provide	an	answer	to	Goodworth	and	Ashworth’s	(2012)	confusion	over	the	mainstreams’	hesitance	to	investigate	the	breakdown	of	the	money	multiplier.	However,	as	established	in	chapters	one	and	two,	central	bankers	themselves	do	not	expect	the	bank	funding	channel	to	operate	all,	or	even	most	of	the	time,	only	in	situations	where	there	is	general	shortage	of	liquidity.	The	key	channel	is	actually	considered	to	be	the	portfolio	substitution	channel.	This	is	the	major	missed	of	opportunity	of	Post-Keynesian	critiques	of	QE	thus	far,	as	authors	such	as	Lavoie	and	Rochon	have	tended	to	focus	exclusively	on	the	bank	funding	channel	implying	that	if	the	bank	funding	channel	fails	QE	is	therefore	rendered	ineffective.	The	term	‘missed	opportunity’	is	used	deliberately,	as	this	chapter	will	argue	that	the	same	basic	logic	used	in	their	critiques	can	also	be	applied	to	the	portfolio	substitution	channel	and	used	to	help	explain	the	breakdown	of	the	portfolio	
rebalancing	mechanism.	This	will	however	require	an	brief	detour	into	the	debates	between	‘horizontal’	and	‘structural’	endogenous	money.		
3.3	Structural	endogenous	money	and	the	portfolio	rebalancing	effect	For	what	is	most	likely	the	sake	of	simplicity,	Lavoie	and	Rochon	present	their	endogenous	money	supply	as	almost	totally	horizontal	when	breaking	down	the	problems	with	QE’s	bank	funding	channel.	However,	to	apply	the	same	kind	of	criticisms	to	the	case	of	portfolio	rebalancing	in	Japan	it	is	necessary	to	complicate	this	picture	somewhat	and	adopt	a	model	of	the	money	supply	that,	whilst	still	endogenous,	is	‘structural’	rather	than	horizontal.	It	is	important	to	clarify	here,	in	the	interest	of	not	mischaracterizing	the	debate,	that	neither	Lavoie	nor	Rochon	define	themselves	as	strict	horizontalists.	Rochon	(writing	with	horzontalism’s	originator	Moore,	2014)	attempts	to	synthesize	both	approaches	and	whilst	Palley	(2013:	10)	regards	Lavoie	as	a	‘leading	proponent’	of	the	horizontalist	model	he	also	acknowledges	this	his	writing	
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has	gradually	integrated	many	structuralist	criticisms.	Indeed,	Lavoie	himself	(2014:	186)	wrote	that	the	structuralist	model	has	‘brought	some	clarifications	and	provided	new	details	to	the	basic	horizontalist	story.’	In	general digging	into	the	long	history	of	debates	between	horizontalists	and	structuralists	in	the	canon	of	Post-Keynesian	economics	would	be	a	distraction	here	but	for	a	good	summary	of	these	debates	and	their	implications	see	Wray	(2007),	Lucarelli	(2013)	and	Palley	(2013).	For	the	purposes	of	this	project	the	key	difference	between	the	two	models	is	the	role	played	by	the	central	bank.	Lucarelli	(2013:	355,	emphasis	added)	explains	that	for	horizontalists: Credit	is…demand-driven	and	independent	of	the	official	rate	of	interest.	The	only	limits	to	the	creation	of	credit	are	the	propensity	of	economic	agents	to	borrow	and	their	creditworthiness	from	the	standpoint	of	the	banking	system.	In	this	overall	scheme,	the	central	bank	merely	accommodates	the	demand	for	credit	
money	and	acts	as	the	supplier	of	legal	tender…The	crucial	point	stressed	by	Horizontalists	is	that	these	monetary	reserves	are	simply	the	residual	after	the	demand	for	credit	money	has	been	automatically	met.	In	other	words,	from	the	horizontalist	point	of	view	central	banks	do	not	control	the	size	of	the	overall	money	supply.	This	is	because	in	the	horizontal	model	money’s	creation	always	follows	a	strict	causal	sequence:	first	demand	for	money	is	met	by	the	extension	of	private	credit,	then	credit	generates	deposits,	and	finally	deposits	determine	the	level	of	reserves,	as	the	central	bank	comes	in	at	the	end	to	back	the	loans	
already	made	by	private	banks.	Structuralists	on	the	other	hand	see	a	somewhat	more	active	role	in	the	process	for	the	central	bank,	as	Lucarelli	(2013:	357-8,	emphasis	added)	again	explains:		Structuralists	argue…that	the	central	bank	does	not	necessarily	accommodate	the	creation	of	credit	by	supplying	reserves	to	banks.	The	central	bank	plays	an	active	and	pivotal	role	through	its	decisions	whether	to	lend	in	order	to	mitigate	the	effects	of	excessive	credit	creation	by	banks.	Hence,	central	banks	themselves	
form	liquidity	preferences.	As	the	residual	supplier	of	liquidity	to	the	economy	as	a	whole,	the	central	bank	is	able	to	set	the	short-term	base	rate	of	interest,	which	then	acts	as	the	official	anchor	or	benchmark	in	the	regulation	of	liquidity	within	the	banking	system.	
	 40	
The	crucial	point	of	difference	here	is	that	central	banks	have	their	own	liquidity	preference	separate	to	that	of	private	banks.	In	fact,	for	structuralists	all	the	key	economic	agents	(households,	firms,	banks	and	the	central	bank)	have	their	own	separate	level	of	liquidity	preference.	The	creation	of	monetary	flows	and	the	determination	of	the	interest	rates	are	still	both	created	endogenously	within	the	system	and	credits	still	precede	deposits,	however	they	arise	as	a	negotiation	between	these	separate	liquidity	preferences	(Lucarelli,	2013:	357).	At	this	point	the	question	remains	-	why	it	is	crucial	to	make	the	distinction	that	the	money	supply	in	Japan	is	structural	rather	than	horizontal?	This	is	for	two	reasons.	The	first	is	that	while	a	horizontal	framework	is	sufficient	to	understand	the	bank	funding	channel	(because	the	bank	funding	channel	failed	so	completely),	in	the	case	of	the	portfolio	substitution	channel	the	central	banks	policies	in	Japan	have	had	some	effect,	devaluing	the	Yen	as	well	as	briefly	increasing	equity	prices	and	lowering	bond	yields	(as	discussed	in	chapter	2).	This	means	that	if	QE	is	to	be	understood	through	an	endogenous	money	framework	it	must	be	one	that	understands	the	central	bank	to	have	some	capacity	to	act,	beyond	simply	supplying	reserves	to	accommodate	the	loans	private	banks	have	already	made.	The	second	and	more	substantial	reason	is	that	the	structuralist	model	understands	monetary	flows	as	the	interaction	between	separate	levels	of	liquidity	preference.	This	is	essential	in	the	Japanese	case	because,	as	has	been	already	argued,	the	key	to	understanding	the	failure	of	the	portfolio	rebalancing	
mechanism	in	Japan	lies	with	firms’	seemingly	insatiable	desire	for	cash	and	deposits	–	their	liquidity	preference.	Which	has	so	far	matched,	Yen	for	Yen,	the	desire	to	dispose	of	liquidity	on	the	part	of	the	BoJ.		QE,	tied	as	it	is	to	the	belief	in	the	power	of	an	exogenous	money	supply,	basically	assumes	that	firms	simply	do	not	have	a	liquidity	preferences.	Instead	it	relies	on	the	set	of	assumptions	outlined	at	the	end	of	chapter	one,	seeing	the	firm	as	a	strictly	rational	actor	that	always	makes	a	profit	motivated	decisions	in	the	short	run.	Koo	(2011:	75)	neatly	summarizes	how	the	designers	of	QE	understand	the	motives	of	firms,	writing	that:	‘Today’s	macroeconomics	assumes	that	private-sector	firms	are	maximizing	profits	at	all	times,	meaning	that	given	a	low	enough	interest	rate,	they	should	be	willing	to	borrow	money	to	invest.’	This	in	turn	implies	that	central	bank	must	play	a	specific	and	active	role.	As	Koo	(2011:	75,	emphasis	added)	goes	on	to	
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explain:	‘With	private-sector	firms	acting	in	a	forward-looking	manner	at	all	times,	a	recession	can	occur	only	if	the	supply	of	money	is	disrupted	at	either	the	central-bank	or	commercial-bank	level.	In	other	words,	all	recessions	are	rooted	in	
problems	with	the	supplier	or	lender	of	money.	The	fundamental	problem	with	designing	monetary	policy	from	this	perspective	is	that	actually	firms	do	have	a	liquidity	preference	and	in	Japan	since	1998	that	preference	seems	to	have	no	upper	limit.	Here	the	fundamental	point	is	same	as	Lavoie	and	Rochon’s	critique	of	the	bank	funding	channel.	At	its	most	basic	level	the	existence	of	liquidity	preference	in	an	endogenous	money	system	means	that	simply	giving	an	economic	agent	money	is	not	itself	an	inducement	for	that	agent	to	invest.	Just	as	banks	do	not	need	reserves	to	make	loans,	firms	do	not	need	reserves	to	borrow	from	banks.	Though	it	seems	an	intuitively	simple	point	that	giving	someone	money	is	no	guarantee	they	will	spend	it,	the	lack	of	endogenous	money	framework	means	this	fact	remains	invisible	to	the	mainstream.	Instead	we	are	faced	with	a	situation	where	the	BoJ	sees	an	almost	twenty-year	pattern	of	accumulating	savings	in	the	private	sector	and	decides	the	solution	is	to	pump	even	more	liquidity	into	the	system.	Koo	(2011:	74)	equates	this	logic	to	that	of	doctor	who	when	faced	with	a	patient	whose	proscribed	medicine	has	no	effect	then	advises	the	patient	to	take	100	times	their	original	dose,	instead	of	changing	the	prescription.		While	an	endogenous	money	framework	can	highlight	the	role	that	liquidity	preference	plays	in	frustrating	the	transmission	mechanism	of	QE	it	also	highlights	the	impact	that	different	levels	of	demand	for	money	have	of	the	timing	of	monetary	expansion.	Recall	that	the	previous	chapter	requested	the	reader	note	the	difference	in	impact	on	equity	prices	between	US	and	UK	QE1	(where	there	was	some	portfolio	rebalancing)	and	QE2	(where	there	was	essentially	none)	(See	Goodhart	and	Ashworth,	2012:	665).	This	pattern	begins	to	make	sense	in	an	endogenous	model	where	money	creation	is	fundamentally	driven	by	demand.	QE1	was	implemented	directly	after	the	global	financial	crisis	in	a	context	where	firms	were	heavily	leveraged	and	needed	to	pay	off	their	debts	before	they	could	consider	new	investments.	This	enacts	what	Lavoie	(2016:	69)	identifies	as	a	‘reflux	principle’	in	which	firms	use	the	newly	deposited	
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reserves	to	pay	off	debts	cancelling	out	any	growth	in	the	overall	money	supply.	Recall	that	in	Lucarelli’s	(2013:	357-8)	definition	of	the	structuralist	model,	the	central	bank	rate	acts	as	the	‘anchor’	for	the	level	of	liquidity	in	the	system	as	a	whole.	In	QE1	this	is	precisely	the	role	the	Fed	and	BoE	played,	pushing	liquidity	back	into	the	system	and	allowing	firms	to	de-leverage	which	in	turn	meant	there	was	some	tentative	re-entry	back	into	equity	markets.	However,	what	was	in	reality	central	banks	playing	an	essentially	defensive	role	(in	which	any	actual	growth	of	the	money	supply	was	cancelled	out	by	this	‘reflux	principle’)	was	instead	interpreted	by	the	mainstream	as	evidence	for	both	the	multiplier	effect	and	the	portfolio	rebalancing	effect.	These	banks	therefore	enacted	a	second	round	of	easing	(QE2)	in	2010	expecting	the	same	result	and	not	understanding	that	pushing	more	liquidity	into	the	economy	when	firms	had	already	rebuilt	their	liquidity	buffers	would	not	have	the	same	outcome.		Turning	to	the	case	of	Japan	a	similar	desire	to	de-leverage	characterized	firm	behavior	after	the	property	bubble	burst	in	the	early	1990s.	As	discussed	in	chapter	2,	Japanese	firms	turned	away	from	new	investments	and	towards	paying	down	existing	debts,	increasing	the	level	of	assets	held	as	cash	and	deposits.	Indeed,	Koo	(2011,	42)	writes	that:	‘It	would	seem	that	the	people	using	the	term	‘lost	decade’	to	describe	the	1990s	have	never	looked	at	balance	sheet	improvements	made	by	Japanese	companies.’	However,	he	also	notes	that	‘economy	wide	attempts	to	repair	damaged	balance	sheets	resulted	in	a	fallacy	of	composition	that	threw	the	economy	into	a	prolonged	recession.’	It	was	into	this	context	that	the	first	(2001-2006)	BoJ	QE	program	was	enacted,	and	since	then	the	savings	behavior	of	these	firms	has	gone	far	beyond	de-leveraging,	to	the	point	where	Japanese	firms	are	now	the	most	liquid	in	the	world.	It	is	therefore	less	surprising	that	the	current	round	of	BoJ	QE	beginning	in	2012	has	had	so	little	effect	on	equity	prices	beyond	an	initial	bump	caused	by	foreign	investors.	The	BoJ	remains	committed	to	QE	however,	as	the	assumption	of	an	exogenous	money	supply	rules	out	consideration	of	how	demand	for	money	will	influence	QE’s	implementation.		This	transformation	of	QE,	from	short	term	liquidity	injection	into	what	seems	to	be	a	permanent	policy	of	cheap	central	bank	money	is	a	fascinating	example	of	a	global	phenomenon	where	monetary	policies	originally	envisioned	to	be	short	term	crisis	solutions	are	being	reverse-engineered	into	long	term	interventions	in	an	attempt	to	restart	economies	experiencing	secular	stagnation.	As	authors	such	as	Wakatabe	(2015)	
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have	argued,	Japan	may	hold	many	lessons	for	the	rest	of	the	developed	world	here,	as	they	have	been	dealing	with	stagnation	much	longer	than	the	rest	of	the	high-income	economies	(with	the	possible	exception	of	Italy).			
	
3.4	Introducing	path-dependent	factors		 If	an	endogenous	money	model	can	explain,	at	least	in	the	abstract,	how	liquidity	preference	frustrates	QE’s	transmission	mechanisms	then	the	questions	remains:		why	not	simply	stop	here?	Why	not	tie	of	this	narrative	as	a	neat	Keynesian	story	about	the	inadequacy	of	monetary	policy?	In	short	this	is	because	in	the	case	of	QE	an	endogenous	money	model	can	explain	the	how	but	not	the	why.	The	existence	of	liquidity	preference	in	an	endogenous	system	explains	how	pumping	more	liquidity	into	that	system	may	not	stimulate	the	economy,	but	the	question	remains	-	why	are	the	liquidity	preferences	of	Japanese	firms	so	high?	As	discussed	in	chapter	2,	surplus	hoarding	is	occurring	on	a	scale	in	Japan	beyond	that	of	other	developed	economies.	This	raises	the	question	–	are	there	historical-structural	factors	specific	to	the	Japanese	context	that	are	causing	the	high	liquidity	preference	of	firms?	To	answer	this	question,	the	next	chapter	turns	to	drawing	out	a	theory	of	the	firm	from	structuralist	literature	that	specializes	in	the	Japanese	context	–	Chalmers’	Johnson	theory	of	the	capitalist	developmental	state.	The	last	chapter	(chapter	5),	will	then	combine	the	Keynesian	concepts	of	liquidity	preference	in	an	endogenous	money	system	discussed	here	with	these	structuralist	insights	from	chapter	4	in	order	to	develop	a	theory	of	liquidity	preference	specific	to	the	Japanese	context.			 	
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Chapter	4	
	
The	Japanese	developmental	firm	–	Structural	factors	contributing	to	private	
sector	liquidity	preference	in	Japan			 The	previous	chapter	established	how	liquidity	preference	has	disrupted	the	transmission	channels	of	QE	in	Japan	at	the	level	of	macroeconomic	dynamics	in	the	abstract.	Next	it	is	necessary	to	ask	the	question	-	why	is	the	liquidity	preference	of	Japanese	firms	specifically	so	high?	This	chapter	introduces	concepts	from	the	capitalist	developmental	state	(CDS)	literature	in	order	to	explain	how	the	distinctive	characteristics	of	firms	under	this	developmental	system,	features	that	once	did	so	much	to	encourage	GDP	growth	during	Japan’s	boom	era,	have	become	institutionalized	incentives	for	private	sector	inaction	during	Japan’s	period	of	secular	stagnation.		The	CDS	literature	originated	in	Chalmers	Johnsons’	MITI	and	the	Japanese	
Miracle	(1982),	as	an	attempt	to	understand	the	role	the	Japanese	Ministry	of	International	Trade	and	Industry	had	played	in	the	country’s	rapid	industrial	development.	It	subsequently	expanded	into	a	theory	of	the	role	that	state	bureaucracies	played	in	creating	a	‘plan	rational’	developmental	model	in	the	East	Asian	newly	developed	countries	(NICs)	of	Japan,	South	Korea,	Taiwan	and	Singapore.	This	model	combined	an	active	state-led	strategic	industrial	policy	with	an	aggressively	expanding	export	sector.	This	literature	typically	conceptualized	Japan’s	political	economy	as	an	‘Iron	Triangle’	of	co-constitutive	economic	rule	between	Japan’s	liberal-democratic	party,	the	state	bureaucracy	and	the	keiretsu	mega-firms.	Johnson	is	keen	to	impress	that:	‘like	a	physical	tripod	each	leg	is	indispensable	for	the	stability	of	the	structure’	(1995:	116).	However,	the	leg	that	actually	distinguishes	this	system	from	a	purely	planned	economy	–	the	firm,	has	been	somewhat	neglected	as	the	CDS	literature	has	gone	on	to	develop	into	a	theory	of	the	role	played	by	state	bureaucracies	and	industrial	policies	in	east	Asian	development.	However,	this	project	will	argue	that	there	are	latent	yet	novel	insights	arising	from	this	literature	about	the	nature	of	Japanese	firms	that	have	the	advantage	of	conceptualizing	firms	as	institutional	actors	as	opposed	to	rational	actors.	Indeed,	in	terms	of	where	the	economic	thought	of	Chalmers	Johnson	sits	within	the	boarder	heterodoxy	it	is	probably	most	closely	
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associated	with	old-intuitionalist	and	development-structuralist	approaches.	In	his	1999	piece	The	Economic	Theory	of	the	Developmental	State	old-institutional	economist	Ha-Joon	Chang	positions	Johnson’s	theory	as	explicitly	anti	neoliberal	and	places	the	concept	of	the	developmental	state	within	the	broader	tradition	of	developmental	economics,	equating	it	to	similar	ideas	in	the	prior	work	of	Alexander	Gershenkron,	Paul	Baran	and	Gunnar	Myrdal.	In	terms	of	policy	prescriptions,	particularly	on	trade,	the	CDS	literature	aligns	most	closely	with	the	school	of	thought	associated	with	Latin	American	economists	such	as	Raul	Prebisch	and	Celso	Furtardo,	the	group	Lavoie,	(2015:	7)	in	his	categorization	of	heterodox	schools	of	thought	in	economics,	refers	to	as	the	‘development	structuralists’.	For	the	sake	of	simplicity,	this	project	has	referred	to	the	CDS	literature	and	associated	ideas	generically	as	‘structuralist’	as	they	prioritize	the	importance	of	path-developmental	features	in	national	economic	development.		This	project	is	actually	not	the	first	to	integrate	insights	from	this	CDS	literature	with	a	Post-Keynesian	analysis	of	contemporary	Japan.	Lucarelli	(2015)	incorporates	Johnson’s	concept	of	Japan	as	a	‘plan	rational	state’	that	relied	on	‘an	export	led	developmental	model’	in	his	analysis	of	secular	stagnation	in	Japan	as	an	example	of	a	Minsky-Fischer	debt-deflation	type	depression.	There	he	uses	CDS	theory	as	a	supplemental	literature	to	the	main	Minskian	arguments,	where	it	provides	‘a	historical	perspective	to	argue	that	there	is	a	structural	and	institutional	dimension	to	the	secular	crisis’	(Lucarelli,	2015:	311).	In	order	to	build	on	this	contribution	from	Lucarelli,	section	4.1	of	this	chapter	first	organizes	the	characterization	of	firms	in	the	CDS	literature,	into	three	essential	features:	long-term	orientation,	managerial	autonomy	and	provision	of	social	security,	establishing	the	growth	creation	role	these	characteristics	played	during	Japan’s	boom	era.	Section	4.2	will	then	seek	to	as	much	as	possible	to	acknowledge	and	then	discard	the	latent	normative	approval	present	in	much	of	the	CDS	literature	and	re-contextualize	these	characteristics	in	the	newer	context	of	Japan’s	secular	stagnation.	This	will	be	in	order	to	explain	how	features	that	originally	facilitated	Japan’s	rapid	growth	have	become	inherited	structural	barriers	to	firms	returning	to	their	position	as	net	investors.	These	structural	push	factors	towards	liquidity	preference	are	summarized	in	the	section	4.3,	a	brief	preface	for	the	next	chapter	(chapter	5)	which	will	suggest	a	synthesis	of	these	structural	factors	with	the	Post-Keynesian	notions	of	liquidity	preference	and	endogenous	money	already	
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introduced,	in	order	to	propose	a	concept	of	liquidity	preference	specific	to	contemporary	Japan		This	chapter	will	of	course	be	relying	on	the	work	written	by	the	originator	of	CDS	theory,	Chalmers	Johnson.	However,	it	also	draws	particularly	on	contributions	from	Woo-Cummings	who	edited	The	Developmental	State	(1999),	a	significant	collection	of	essays	from	different	scholars	in	this	area,	as	well	as	Chu	whose	The	Asian	
Developmental	State:	Re-examinations	and	New	Departures	(2016)	is	a	similar	volume	presenting	more	recent	research.		
	
4.1	The	Japanese	keiretsu	in	CDS	theory	–	three	essential	features		 While	an	explicit	theory	of	the	firm	is	not	laid	out	in	the	CDS	literature,	the	way	firms	are	conceptualised	in	this	framework	nonetheless	has	a	distinct	advantage	over	the	neo-classical	conception.	As	established	previously,	the	portfolio	rebalancing	
mechanism	at	the	heart	of	QE’s	operational	logic	assumes	a	rational,	utility	maximising	subject	and	subsequently	assumes	that	firms	will	have	no	liquidity	preference	when	the	option	to	generate	short-run	profit	is	available.	Conversely,	the	CDS	literature	conceptualises	firms	as	economic	actors	in	the	structuralist	sense,	collaborators	in	a	broader	process	of	development	that	have	their	own	institutionalized	motivations	which	go	beyond	short-run	pecuniary	interest.	This	latent	theory	of	(what	will	here	be	called	for	convenience)	the	developmental	firm	can	be	distilled	into	three	essential	aspects	in	the	Japanese	case:	long-term	orientation,	managerial	autonomy	and	role	as	social	welfare	provider.		
4.1.1	Long-term	orientation	One	of	the	most	fundamental	characteristics	of	the	Japanese	keiretsu	within	the	developmental	model	is	that	rather	than	being	understood	solely	as	individual	profit	maximising	units,	they	are	also	conceived	as	constituent	contributors	to	long-term	strategies	that	will	create	growth	at	the	national	level,	even	when	these	strategies	may	be	unprofitable	in	the	short-term	for	the	individual	firm.	Johnson	(1995:	61)	quotes	the	former	president	of	Fuji	Bank,	Hashimoto	Toru	as	stating	that:	
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Fattening	the	companies’	profits	at	the	expense	of	employees,	clients,	stockholders,	and	society	is	economic	efficiency	for	its	own	sake.	Only	the	company	profits	from	it…The	Japanese	company	emphasises	only	internal	reserves	and	new	investment	in	plant	and	equipment.	Johnson	(1995:	61)	also	quotes	Kawake	Jiro,	former	president	of	Oji	Paper	who	concurs	with	Hashimoto	writing	that	‘Japanese	managers	take	a	long-term	view	and	place	emphasis	on	capital	investment	and	retained	earnings.’	This	identifies	the	first	aspect	of	the	developmental	firm’s	long-term	orientation	–	a	strong	emphasis	on	maintaining	liquidity	buffers	and	prioritising	internal	investments,	particularly	on	fixed	capital	such	as	plant	equipment.	Important	to	flag	here	is	that	private-sector	capital	investment	has	fallen	off	significantly	since	the	1990s,	indicated	by	the	shrinking	size	of	Japan’s	overall	gross	fixed	capital	formation	(GFCF)	though	this	has	still	left	Japan	with	a	legacy	of	significant	sunk	costs	in	fixed	capital.	Section	4.2.1	of	this	chapter	returns	to	this	issue,	though	for	now	the	salient	point	is	that	Japanese	firms	have	historically	focused	on	internal,	not	external	spending.		Concomitant	to	this	focus	on	internal	investment	is	the	second	aspect	of	the	developmental	firm’s	long-term	orientation	–	focus	on	market	share.	As	Woo-Cummings	(1999:	18)	explains:	the	zaibatsu	[the	keiretsu’s	pre-war	predecessors]	worked	much	more	for	market	share	rather	than	solely	for	their	own	profit,	typically	operating	at	a	loss…Their	activity…	was	rarely	driven	by	ordinary	market	concerns	of	price,	and	of	supply	and	demand.	The	salient	point	here	again	is	that	firms	are	willing	to	sacrifice	profit	in	the	short-term	to	create	a	dominant	position	within	the	market	over	the	long-term,	a	goal	that	prioritizes	the	growth	and	survival	of	the	firm	as	an	institution	over	quick	payouts	to	shareholders.	This	prompts	the	question:	how	did	these	keiretsu	avoid	the	pressures	normally	applied	to	firms	to	generate	short-term	profit?	The	answer	is	a	high	degree	of	managerial	autonomy.		
4.1.2	Managerial	autonomy	The	two	principal	sources	of	pressure	on	a	large	firm	to	generate	short-term	profits	are	typically	competition	from	other	firms	and	pressure	from	shareholders	to	
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generate	dividends.	The	keiretsu	avoided	these	pressures	through	a	system	of	cross-competitor	shareholding	unusual	in	economies	following	the	Anglo-American	model.	Writing	on	the	work	of	Ministry	of	Trade	and	Industry	bureaucrat	Koji	Matsumoto,	Johnson	(1995:	63)	explains	how	whilst	a	keiretsu	may	technically	be	a	publically	listed	company,	they	will	carefully	control	who	can	become	major	shareholders.	He	writes	that:	 These	chosen	shareholders	are	a	firms’	domestic	competitors,	intermediated	by	its	financial	partners;	together	they	hold	approximately	70	percent	of	the	shares	in	each	other’s	firms	thereby	preventing	takeovers	by	keeping	the	numbers	of	tradable	shares	below	a	controlling	interest.	The	shares	that	a	company	holds	in	its	competitors’	firms	are	never	sold	regardless	of	price.		This	system	allows	firms	that	are	technically	competitors	to	shield	each	other	from	real	competition	by	raising	high	barriers	for	new	entrants	into	the	domestic	market.	It	also	minimizes	the	power	that	can	be	wielded	by	individual,	non-institutional	shareholders,	who	are	the	type	of	shareholder	most	likely	to	apply	pressure	for	the	firm	to	pay	higher	dividends	in	the	short-term.	Subsequently	dividends	in	Japan	have	historically	been	very	low,	averaging	only	1%	at	the	height	of	the	1980s	boom	(Johnson,	1995:	56).	Instead	firms	could	pursue	the	kind	of	long-term	investment	strategies	outlined	above,	exercising	what	Koji	(as	quoted	by	Johnson,	1995:	63)	calls	‘the	autonomy	of	management’.	From	the	bureaucracy’s	perspective	this	managerial	autonomy	was	preferable	as	it	allowed	the	keiretsu	to	act	as	compliant	transmitters	of	industrial	policy,	as	long	as	these	polices	were	in	the	interests	of	the	firm’s	management.	However,	it	also	had	another	advantage	from	the	state’s	perspective	as	it	led	these	large	firms	to	become	permanent	fixtures	of	Japanese	social	life,	creating	another	hallmark	of	the	Japanese	developmental	system	–	firms	acting	as	providers	of	social	security.		
4.1.3	Provision	of	social	security		 It	is	important	here	to	clarify	that	in	Japan	firms	are	not	the	providers	of	social	security	in	exactly	the	same	sense	a	government	would	be,	providing	direct	redistributive	social	transfers	through	a	welfare	programs.	Rather	it	is	the	case	that	in	Japan	the	way	social	security	is	conceptualised	and	implemented	is	based	upon	the	assumption	of	a	gender	bifurcated	household	in	which	the	woman	maintains	the	home	
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and	acts	as	primary	caregiver	and	the	man	receives	long-term	fulltime	employment	in	a	large	firm.	In	Esping-Anderson’s	(1990)	ubiquitous	‘threefold	typology’	of	welfare	states	(liberal,	social-democratic	and	corporatist)	Japan	is	usually	categorised	as	conforming	to	the	‘conservative’	or	‘corporatist’	type	present	in	countries	such	as	France,	Italy	and	Austria.	A	primary	reason	for	this	being	that	‘Japan	has	developed	a	social	insurance	system	that	is	segmented	along	occupational	lines	and	largely	financed	by	wage-based	contributions’	(Miura,	2012:	31).	An	example	of	this	structure	is	prevision	of	old-age	pension,	which	is	composed	of	three	tiers.	The	first	tier	-	The	National	Pension	system	-	is	government	funded	and	flat-rate	for	both	contributions	and	pension	payments.	However,	the	second	two	tiers	-	the	compulsory	Employee’s	Pension	System	and	the	voluntary	private	Corporate	Pension	System	-	are	based	on	earnings	(Takayama	and	Kitamura	(2009:	98).	It	this	kind	of	structure	that	prompts	Miura	(2012:	12)	to	characterize	the	Japanese	social	security	system	as	a	‘gendered	dual	system’	of	‘welfare	through	work’	‘where	employment	maintenance	policies	functionally	substitute	for	[government]	income	maintenance	policies.’	Even	the	government	funded	tier	of	pensions	relies	on	the	assumption	of	a	long	periods	of	stable	employment	as	it	operates	as	an	insurance	scheme	in	which	those	covered	are	legally	required	to	have	contributed	for	25	years	in	order	to	access	the	payments	(Takayama	&	Kitamura,	2009:	100).	In	this	structure	firms	play	roles	equivalent	to	those	that	governments	would	typically	play	in	a	liberal	or	social-democratic	welfare	state,	making	them	social	institutions	in	a	way	that	is	at	odds	with	the	strictly	pecuniary	definition	of	the	private	sector	dominant	in	the	Anglo-American	model	of	capitalism.	Indeed,	firm’s	socio-cultural	role	in	Japan	goes	beyond	simply	providing	employment	insurance,	keiretsu	in	Japan	also	inspire	in	long-term	employees	a	form	of	identification	closer	to	that	of	national	identity.	Writing	again	on	the	work	of	Koji,	Johnson	(1995:	63)	explains	that	this	employment	system	in	which	promotion	is	typically	based	on	seniority,	engenders	a	kind	of	patriotism	towards	the	keiretsu.	He	writes	that	Koji:		Compares	the	loyalty	that	Japanese	workers	feel	toward	their	companies	to	nationalism…Nationalism	is	fostered	because	people	are	normally	not	able	to	choose	whatever	country	they	want	and	freely	move	from	on	to	another.	Just	as	the	inability	to	country-hop	produces	nationalism,	so	the	relative	inability	to	job-hop	in	Japan	produces	labour	commitment	to	the	firm.	
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A	telling	example	of	this	kind	of	corporate	identification	can	be	seen	in	sports.	In	the	
Nippon	Baseball	League,	the	largest	professional	league	for	Japan’s	most	popular	sport,	although	the	teams	represent	different	cities	or	regions	of	the	country	they	are	named	after	the	keiretsu	that	own	them	-	the	Hanshin	Tigers,	Yomuiri	Giants,	Yakult	Swallows	etc.	Woo-Cummings	(1999:	17-18)	perhaps	best	describes	this	‘quasi-state’	role	using	the	example	not	of	the	Japanese	keiretsu,	but	their	Korean	cousins	the	chaebol	writing	that:		 The	typical	Hyundai	worker	drives	a	Hyundai	car,	lives	in	a	Hyundai	apartment,	gets	his	mortgage	from	Hyundai	credit,	receives	health	care	at	a	Hyundai	hospital,	sends	his	kids	to	school	on	Hyundai	loans	or	scholarships,	and	eats	his	meals	at	Hyundai	cafeteria’s.	In	the	light	of	this	social	model	it	becomes	more	explicable	that	income	inequality	shrank	during	Japan’s	boom	despite	the	fact	that	‘the	government’s	social	spending	has	generally	been	low	by	international	standards’	(Miura,	2012:	12).		
4.2	The	developmental	firm	under	secular	stagnation	–	pro-growth	strategies	
become	structural	barriers		 The	chief	challenge	for	the	CDS	literature	has	been	that	it	describes	a	model	of	state	led	development	that	is	oriented	fundamentally	around	achieving	consistent	GDP	growth,	which	has	not	been	the	case	for	Japan	since	the	asset	price	bubble	burst	in	1991.	Chu	(2016:	18)	explains	that	Chalmers	Johnson	remained	bullish	on	his	theory,	arguing	that	despite	the	challenges	brought	by	economic	globalization	there	was	still	‘room	for	continued	developmental	intervention	and	that	he	has	no	doubt	the	developmental	state	would	fare	better	than	the	regulatory	state’	the	‘regulatory	state’	being	his	term	for	the	Anglo-American	system.	Woo-Cummings	(1999:	31)	argues	along	similar	lines	writing	that	the	developmental	state	model	‘is	more	resilient	and	efficacious	than	the	western	observers	give	it	credit	for	–	with	or	without	the	East	Asian	economic	crisis	of	the	late	1990s.’	With	the	exception	of	authors	such	as	Pirie	(2016),	who	argues	that	South	Korea	has	reached	the	limits	of	profitability	under	the	developmental	model,	the	trend	within	the	CDS	literature	has	not	been	towards	internal	
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critique.	This	may	be	due	the	fact	that	economists	such	as	Laura	Tyson	(chair	of	the	US	President’s	Council	of	Economic	Advisors	during	the	Clinton	administration),	or	Ha-Joon	Chang,	who	have	both	been	associated	with	Johnson’s	work,	have	explicitly	advocated	for	developmental-state	style	strategic	industrial	policies	to	be	adopted	in	the	west	(See	Woo-Cumings,	1999:	29-30,	Chang,	1999).	However,	to	understand	how	the	legacy	of	the	developmental	model	has	contributed	to	a	structural	entrenchment	of	private	sector	liquidity	preference	in	Japan	it	is	essential	to	separate	the	CDS	literature	from	this	normative	approval	of	the	model	it	describes.	In	the	case	of	the	three	features	of	Japanese	developmental	firms	outlined	above,	each	one	has	institutionalized	a	structural	motivation	towards	surplus	hoarding	and	under-investment,	confounding	the	ambitions	of	the	BoJ	QE	program.	It	is	therefore	necessary	to	address	each	feature	once	more,	re-contextualized	for	contemporary,	stagnant,	Japan.		
	 4.2.1	Long-term	investments	become	‘sunk	costs’		 As	outlined	above	the	long-term	orientation	of	Japan’s	developmental	firms	entailed	a	focus	on	internal	reserves	and	internal	investment	on	fixed	capital.	When	the	goal	was	market	share	and	the	future	promised	growth	this	made	sense.	However,	in	the	context	of	secular	stagnation	this	investment	in	future	capacity	became	a	structural	limitation	for	Japanese	firms.	As	Lucarelli	(2015:	314)	explains:		The	keiretsu	that	had	invested	in	extra	capacity	to	meet	the	demand	caused	by	the	1980s	boom	soon	found	that	they	were	burdened	with	massive	excess	capacity	and	escalating	debt/equity	ratios...	Problems	of	excess	capacity	emerged	since	investment	in	fixed	capital	was	dependent	upon	long-term	rates	of	return,	which	could	not	be	validated	in	the	short	term	as	borrowing	costs	rose	quite	precipitously.	Under	these	circumstances,	it	was	very	difficult	to	reactivate	the	process	of	capital	accumulation,	even	at	very	low	rates	of	interest	since	the	accumulated	investment	or	the	“sunk	costs”	in	fixed	capital	tended	to	depreciate	very	slowly	over	a	long	period	of	time.	After	the	property	bubble	burst	in	the	1990s	Japanese	firms	found	themselves	highly	leveraged,	with	the	wealth	they	had	accumulated	during	the	boom	sunk	into	these	fixed	capital	assets	that	could	not	be	quickly	used	to	re-finance	during	the	crisis.	Figure	4.1	shows	how	these	investments	in	capacity,	as	represented	by	the	size	of	Japan’s	GFCF	(as	
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measured	in	trillions	of	current	USD),	grew	rapidly	from	78	billion	USD	in	1970	to	1.6	trillion	USD	in	1995	but	began	to	fall	in	the	mid	1990s.	
Figure	4.1	Gross	fixed	capital	formation	in	Japan	1970-2015	(current	USD	-	trillions)	(Source:	The	World	
Bank	Data)	Without	a	short-term	option	to	reactivate	profitability,	firms	turned	away	from	capital	investment	and	towards	another	long-term	solution	–	paying	down	their	debts	and	rebuilding	their	liquidity	buffers.		Recall	that	despite	the	fact	that	Japanese	firms	were	heavily	leveraged	at	the	start	of	the	1990’s	this	renewed	focus	on	internal	reserves	is	not	inconsistent	with	the	developmental	model.	Returning	to	the	earlier	quote	from	former	Fuji	Bank	president	Hashimoto	(as	quoted	in	Johnson,	1995:61,	emphasis	added):	‘The	Japanese	company	emphasises	only	internal	reserves	and	new	investment	in	plant	and	equipment.’	The	problem	here	for	the	BoJ	is	that	the	goal	of	its	QE	programs	is	to	prompt	firms	to	engage	in	exactly	the	opposite	of	this	behaviour,	rebalancing	their	portfolios	towards	short-term	investments	like	equities.	A	focus	on	profit	over	the	long-term	through	capacity	building	investments,	which	seemed	like	a	responsible	strategy	during	the	boom	thus	became	a	structural	impediment	preventing	a	quick	revitalisation	of	the	Japanese	equity	markets.	As	quoted	in	chapter	two,	Kang	(2015:	8)	explains	that	private	non-residential	
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investment,	once	a	leading	component	of	GDP	growth	‘fell	from	around	20	percent	of	GDP	[in	the	1990s]	to	about	13½	percent	as	of	2013.’	Interesting	to	note	here,	is	that	of	the	two	investment	strategies	associated	with	firms	under	the	Japanese	developmental	model,	it	was	the	actively	developmental	strategy	-	capital	investment	-	that	was	abandoned,	whilst	the	more	passive	strategy	-	growing	liquidity	buffers	-		was	what	survived	the	crisis.	An	example	of	how	a	developmental	framework	can	transform	into	a	stagnation	framework	as	the	macro-economic	context	transforms	around	it.		This	turn	away	from	productive	investments	and	towards	the	accumulation	of	liquid	assets	could	be	understood	as	a	Japan	specific	iteration	of	what	Toporowski	(2008,	2012)	describes	as	‘overcapitalization’.	Toporowski	(2012:	271)	explains	that:	‘Conventional	finance	theory	would	suggest	that	firms	would	only	issue	capital	up	to	the	point	where	the	return	from	their	commercial	and	industrial	activities	would	exceed	the	cost	of	financing	that	capital.’	However,	he	(2012:	271)	argues	that	‘In	practice,	firms	issue	capital	beyond	that	point	and	invest	the	excess	capital	in	liquid	assets’	because	holding	this	excess	capital	may	improve	their	credit	rating,	be	used	as	collateral	or	allow	the	firm	make	profit	on	the	purchases	and	sales	of	smaller	companies	via	balance	sheet	restructuring.	Whilst	Toporowski	(2008:	5)	acknowledges	that	the	rental	cost	of	holding	this	capital	as	bank	reserves	may	be	a	disadvantage	in	competitive	markets,	he	also	explains	that:		where	market	conditions	are	not	competitive,	or	an	oligopolistic	group	of	banks	control	firms	and	prevent	competition	between	those	firms…the	rental	cost	of	capital	is	the	means	by	which	banks	extract	profits	from	the	firms	that	they	control,	and	obtain	a	share	of	the	total	profits	in	the	economy.		The	situation	Toporowksi	describes	in	generic	terms	in	this	passage	bears	significant	similarities	to	the	reality	of	the	developmental	system	in	Japan	as	described	(and	sometimes	lauded)	by	Johnson	and	other	CDS	authors.	They	perhaps	could	not	anticipate	that	both	activity	and	passivity	could	arise	from	this	oligopolistic	system.			
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4.2.2	Managerial	autonomy	institutionalizes	inaction			 One	source	that	could	put	pressure	on	the	keiretsu	to	move	away	from	these	long-term	strategies	and	into	short-term	investments	would	be	pressure	from	individual	shareholders.	However,	as	outlined	above	the	primary	purpose	of	the	Japanese	system	of	cross-shareholding	between	supposedly	rival	keiretsu	was	to	minimize	the	pressure	from	shareholders,	allowing	the	firm	to	keep	dividend	payments	low.	This	created	what	Matsumoto	(as	quoted	by	Johnson,	1995:	62)	calls	the	‘de	facto	total	separation	of	management	from	the	wishes	of	the	owners.’	Yet	even	Japan	has	not	been	immune	from	the	global	trend	of	capital	internationalization,	which	prompts	the	question	of	whether	this	shareholding	system	still	exists.	In	lieu	of	a	thorough	empirical	study	of	keiretsu	ownership	structure	(though	this	could	be	productive	ground	for	future	research)	Mitsubishi	may	for	the	purpose	of	argument	stand	in	as	a	representative	example.	In	the	case	of	Mitsubishi,	foreign	companies	still	only	hold	32.41%	of	shares	and	individual	shareholders	hold	14.97%.	The	largest	single	shareholder,	with	an	investment	ratio	of	8.25%	is	the	Japan	Trustee	Services	bank	the	main	competitor	to	Mitsubishi’s	own	in	house	bank	the	Master	Trust	Bank	of	Japan	who	own	4.89%	(Mitsubishi,	March	2017).	In	the	case	of	Mitsubishi’s	automotive	subsidiary	Mitsubishi-Motors	the	largest	single	shareholder	is	actually	Nissan	with	an	investment	ratio	of	33.99%	(Mitsubishi,	November	2016).	Mitsubishi	is	representative	here	in	the	sense	that	it	demonstrates	that	domestic	ownership	and	cross-held	shares	are	still	features	of	the	contemporary	Japanese	economy	although	they	are	also	diminishing.	In	2017	The	Asian	Nikkei	Review	reported	that	‘the	percentage	of	cross-held	shares	dropped	to	9.9%	of	all	listed	shares	at	the	end	of	2016	--	falling	below	the	10%	mark	for	the	first	time’	(Oshino,	2017).	If	cross	shareholding	is	on	the	wane,	this	necessarily	prompts	the	question	of	whether	Japanese	firms	are	now	paying	higher	dividends,	which	likely	would	represent	the	companies	being	increasingly	subject	to	pressure	from	shareholders.		Curiously	change	on	the	dividend	side	has	been	much	more	modest.	Whilst	in	2017	Authers	reported	for	The	Financial	Times	that	as	of	June	the	dividends	from	Tokyo	listed	equities	actually	exceeded	US	traded	equities,	they	were	quick	to	clarify	that:	‘The	yields	on	both	remain	very	low,	at	2.31	and	2.21	per	cent	respectively,	compared	to	an	average	3.66	per	cent	yield	for	stock	markets	outside	the	US	and	Japan’	(Authers,	2017).	
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The	implication	here	may	be	that	despite	the	gradual	unraveling	of	the	cross-shareholding	structure,	this	system	has	nonetheless	institutionalized	a	culture	of	minimal	pressure	on	keiretsu	governance	from	individual	shareholders,	who	have	been	primed	by	years	of	low	dividends.	This	in	turn	has	serious	implication	for	QE	implementation,	which	relies	(as	discussed	in	chapter	1)	on	the	assumption	that	firms	will	rebalance	their	portfolio’s	for	maximum	profit	in	the	short-term.	Without	pressure	from	individual	shareholders,	keiretsu	are	instead	free	to	continue	to	follow	the	developmental	strategy	of	prioritizing	internal	reserves.			
4.2.3	‘Welfare	through	work’	weakens	organized	labour		 The	other	side	to	the	social	security	through	high	employment	model	outlined	above	is	that	it	involved	a	trade-off	designed	to	keep	organized	labour	weak.	As	Johnson	(1995:	49)	explains:	‘One	of	Japan’s	major	postwar	achievements	was,	after	1960,	meeting	Labor’s	demand	for	job	security	in	return	for	labor’s	giving	up	any	role	in	politics.’1	This	weakness	was	partly	achieved	again	by	the	structuring	of	social	life	around	the	form	of	the	keiretsu.	In	this	case	it	was	the	separation	of	workers	into	unions	divided	by	company	rather	than	by	industry,	a	de-facto	revival	of	the	corporatist	system	of	Sampo	or	Patriotic	Labour	Associations	established	by	the	wartime	government	in	1938	(Johnson,	1995:	31).	This	system	allowed	a	basic	level	of	social	welfare	though	secure	employment	while	also	allowing	Japanese	firms	to	be	competitive	in	the	expansion	of	an	export	led	growth	model	-	keeping	labour	at	a	fixed	cost	by	suppressing	wage	demands.		However,	since	Japan’s	crisis	in	the	early	1990s	this	system	where	firms,	rather	than	unions	are	seen	as	the	guarantors	of	worker’s	prosperity	and	social	status	has	become	a	structural	impediment	to	renewed	private	investment.		Much	in	the	same	way	that	Lucarelli	(2015:	314)	describes	how	investments	in	excess	plant	capacity	became	a	‘sunk	cost’	that	prevented	Japanese	firms	from	being	able	to	‘reactivate	the	process	of	capital	accumulation’	labour	has	become	another	kind	of	sunk	cost	on	the	balance	sheets	of	Japanese	firms.	Where	fixed	capital	assets	could	not	be	jettisoned	because	of	their	low	rates	of	return	over	a	long	period,	similarly	labour	forces	could	not	be	downsized	from	their	boom	levels	because	of	the	structural	role	
																																																						
1	The	approving	language	Johnson	uses	here	is	due	to	the	fact	that	he	sees	this	system	as	better	form	of	‘soft	authoritarianism’	than	the	‘overt	oppression’	exercised	by	the	South	Korean	government	in	1980s,	another	example	of	the	highly	normative	orientation	sometimes	present	in	the	CDS	literature	(1995:	49).	
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assigned	to	firms	as	the	guarantors	of	Japan’s	de	facto	employment	maintenance	social	security	system.	As	Figure	4.2	demonstrates,	despite	Japan’s	economic	woes	since	the	1990s,	unemployment	only	rose	slowly	after	the	property	bubble	burst,	hitting	another	small	peak	after	the	global	financial	crisis	in	2008	before	falling	back	to	3.1%	as	of	2016,	all	the	while	never	exceeding,	5.5%.	
Figure	4.2	Unemployment	in	Japan	-	%	total	labour	force,	modeled	ILO	estimate	(source:	The	World	Bank	
Data)	It	should	of	course	be	noted	here	that	this	focus	on	maintaining	workforce	size	cushioned	Japan	from	one	the	worst	features	of	typical	recessions	–	mass	unemployment.	Indeed,	Ikeda	(2013:181)	argues	that	the	fact	that	the	profit	share	of	labour	rose	after	the	1991	crash,	precisely	because	workforce	sizes	remained	stable	as	the	economy	stagnated,	may	be	what	was	responsible	for	sustaining	a	basic	level	of	domestic	demand	in	Japan.	However,	it	also	prevents	firms	from	investing	in	equities	as	the	BoJ	QE	programs	assume	they	will.	This	is	because	from	the	firm’s	perspective	it	is	safer	to	maintain	large	liquidity	buffers	so	that	they	will	not	have	to	resort	to	layoffs	during	a	downturn.		There	is	also	another	structural	factor	arising	from	Japan’s	high	employment,	weak	organized	labour	system	which,	though	not	a	direct	contributor	to	institutionalized	liquidity	preference,	has	nonetheless	been	an	impediment	to	the	
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success	of	QE	in	Japan	and	so	warrants	discussion	here.	Namely	the	role	that	minimal	upwards	pressure	on	wages	has	played	in	Japan’s	chronic	deflation.	Whilst	Japan	successfully	pursued	a	developmental	export	based	growth	model	before	the	1990s,	low	domestic	prices	were	not	a	major	concern	as	GDP	was	less	dependent	on	domestic	demand.	However,	since	Japan’s	status	as	a	trade	surplus	nation	has	been	diminished	by	competition	from	other	newly	industrializing	Asian	economies,	persistent	deflation	has	become	a	chronic	issue,	(as	discussed	in	chapter	one),	hence	the	BoJ’s	2%	reflation	target.	With	weak	organized	labour	unable	to	put	upward	pressure	on	wages,	a	key	component	of	inflation	is	permanently	missing	in	the	Japanese	context.	Even	mainstream	economists	would	expect	that	the	low	unemployment	rate	Japan	is	currently	experiencing	would	prompt	wage	increases	because	the	lack	of	external	competition	for	positions	gives	more	bargaining	power	to	employees.	However,	the	weak	corporatist	union	model	that	accompanies	Japan’s	keiretsu	based	social	security	system	has	resulted	in	little	to	no	wage	growth	despite	such	low	unemployment	levels.	In	May	of	2017,	Harding	reported	for	the	The	Financial	Times	that	‘the	ratio	of	job	openings	to	applicants	is	near	its	1990	peak,	and	yet	despite	severe	labour	shortages,	wages	are	barely	rising’	with	the	average	12-month	wage	not	exceeding	365,000	Yen	since	its	precipitous	fall	from	380,000	in	2008,	despite	falling	unemployment	during	this	period	(Harding,	2017).	Without	upwards	pressure	on	wages	domestic	purchasing	power	cannot	increase,	and	retailers	cannot	realistically	raise	their	prices,	meaning	deflation	continues.	
	
4.3	From	developmental	to	stagnant:	liquidity	preference	becomes	institutionalized			 During	Japan’s	boom,	firms	operated	under	a	system	that	Johnson	and	his	successors	have	named	the	capitalist	developmental	state,	it	was	a	theory	created	in	order	to	better	explain	miracle	growth,	and	so	‘developmental’	quickly	became	a	kind	of	euphemism	for	any	strategy	that	prioritized	growth	at	the	national	level.	This	leaves	any	project	attempting	to	use	this	literature	to	analyses	contemporary	Japan	with	a	key	question	to	answer:	how	do	the	component	parts	of	this	developmental	system	(in	this	case	firms)	operate	in	an	environment	with	no	development	actually	occurring?	Each	of	the	three	features	outlined	above	originated	as	a	way	to	ensure	that	individual	keiretsu	
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supported	a	system	of	national	GDP	growth	during	the	expansion	of	Japan’s	export	led	growth	model.	However,	whilst	economic	circumstances	have	changed	since	Japan’s	crisis	of	the	early	1990s,	this	developmental	system	has	not	changed	nearly	as	quickly	and	these	developmental	strategies	have	become	institutionalized	incentives	for	firms	to	hoard	liquid	assets.	Investments	in	long	term	capacity	have	become	immobilizing	sunk	costs	that	cannot	be	quickly	payed	off,	cross	shareholding	and	low	dividends	(whilst	finally	eroding)	have	long	insulated	firms	from	the	profit	demands	of	shareholders	and	the	role	firms	play	as	both	the	guarantors	of	high	employment	and	suppressors	of	wage	growth	have	entrenched	deflation	whilst	leaving	firms	responsible	for	the	social	welfare	of	the	nation	and	unable	to	downsize	their	workforces.	The	implications	of	this	for	QE	is	serious.	The	transmission	mechanism	of	QE	relies	on	exploiting	firms’	desire	to	generate	short-run	profits	by	prompting	them	to	rebalance	their	portfolio’s	towards	more	profitable	assets.	However,	the	legacy	of	the	developmental	system	means	that	Japan’s	largest	firms	are	not	motivated	by	short-run	profit.	They	are	instead	operating	according	a	set	of	structural	imperatives	inherited	from	the	developmental	system	that	each	in	their	own	way	push	firms	towards	stockpiling	internal	reserves.	In	the	next	chapter	these	structural	factors	will	be	re-embedded	within	the	Post-Keynesian	concepts	of	liquidity	preference	and	an	endogenous	money	supply	introduced	in	the	previous	chapter.	The	goal	of	this	synthesis	is	provide	a	theory	of	path-dependent	liquidity	preference	that	provides	both	a	general	and	a	specific	explanation	for	the	failure	of	QE	in	Japan.	General	in	the	sense	that	it	explains	at	the	level	of	an	abstract	macro-economic	model	how	liquidity	preference	has	frustrated	QE	and	specific	in	the	sense	that	it	invokes	structural	factors	unique	to	Japan’s	developmental	history	in	order	to	explain	why	liquidity	preference	remains	so	high.			 	
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Chapter	5		
	
Path	Dependent	Liquidity	Preference	and	Quantitative	Easing	in	Japan			 As	the	first	two	chapters	of	this	project	established,	the	2012	QE	program	undertaken	by	the	BoJ,	has	been	frustrated	by	an	unprecedented	level	of	private	sector	liquidity	preference	in	Japan.	The	next	two	chapters	sought	separately	to	answer	two	related	questions:	how	does	liquidity	preference	block	the	transmission	channels	of	QE	in	the	abstract,	and	why	is	the	liquidity	preference	of	firms	in	Japan	is	so	high.	For	the	first	question	chapter	3	established	the	framework	of	liquidity	preference	within	the	context	of	endogenous	money	and	for	the	second	question	chapter	4	outlined	inherited	structural	features	of	Japan’s	developmental	system.	This	chapter	represents	a	preliminary	attempt	to	synthesize	these	Post-Keynesian	and	structuralist	approaches,	combining	the	specific	historical	observations	of	the	CDS	literature	into	the	general	theoretical	framework	of	liquidity	preference	in	order	to	articulate	a	Japanese	context	specific	inflection	of	liquidity	preference	which	is	preliminary	named	here	path-
dependent	liquidity	preference	(PDLP).	This	is	so	that	this	project	may	conclude	with	a	succinct	explanation	of	how	the	transmission	mechanisms	of	QE	have	been	blocked	in	the	Japanese	case.		However,	before	moving	onto	these	arguments	regarding	QE	this	chapter	will	have	to	be	prefaced	with	a	discussion	of	where	this	path-dependent	iteration	fits	into	the	broader	Keynesian	and	Post-Keynesian	vision	of	liquidity	preference.	To	that	end	it	will	draw	particularly	on	the	work	of	writers	who	present	the	concept	of	historical	time	as	central	to	Post-Keynesian	definitions	of	liquidity	preference,	such	as	Joan	Robison	(1980),	Davidson	(2009)	and	Ferrari-Filho	and	Augusto	Camargo	(2005).	It	will	then	offer	two	alterative	suggestions	on	ways	PDLP	could	be	reconceptualised	within	Keynes’	original	threefold	motivations	for	money	demand	as	presented	in	The	General	
Theory.	Backgrounding	this	synthesis	within	a	specific	previously	established	way	of	conceptualising	liquidity	preference	is	important	because	the	danger	of	synthesizing	concepts	from	any	two	schools	of	thought	is	that	it	may	jeopardize	the	internal	logical	consistency	of	both.	The	goal	here	is	that	rather	than	aiming	for	the	creation	of	distinct	new	theory	the	reader	takes	the	application	of	two	approaches	as	akin	to	a	trip	to	the	optometrist,	only	by	looking	at	the	specific	issue	of	QE	in	Japan	through	two	lenses	
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simultaneously,	the	Post-Keynesian	lens	and	the	structuralist	lens,	can	the	phenomenon	be	seen	clearly.			
5.1	Structural	contributions	to	liquidity	preference	–	money	as	the	mediator	of	
historical	time		 There	is	a	precedent	for	incorporating	non-pecuniary	motivations	into	the	determination	of	liquidity	preference,	specifically	within	the	strand	of	Post-Keynesian	thought	that	identifies	that	savings	and	investment	decisions	occur	in	historical	time	rather	than	logical	time.	Bhaduri,	(1985;	1903)	argues	that	since	the	marginalist	revolution	of	the	late	1800s,	theories	of	general	equilibrium	have	drawn	upon	notions	of	space	and	time	taken	from	classical	mathematics	in	which	‘no	sharp	distinction	between	movement	in	space	and	movement	in	time	needs	to	be	made.	The	fact	that	time	is	irreversible	does	not	enter	the	analysis	in	any	essential	way.’	This	framework	of	logical	time	creates	a	kind	of	modelling	in	which,	whilst	events	may	be	described	as	occurring	in	a	temporal	sequence	one	after	another,	they	can	be	theorized	as	occurring	simultaneously.	Davidson	(2009:	326)	explains	that	under	this	neo-classical	paradigm:	‘the	only	economic	decision	that	today’s	market	participants	have	to	solve	is	the	allocation	of	today’s	resources	to	produce	the	most	valuable	quantitative	outcomes	today	and	all	future	dates.’	An	example	of	this	logic	at	work	can	be	seen	in	QE’s	portfolio	
rebalancing	effect	which	assumes	that	if	firms	have	assets	on	their	balance	sheets	that	are	not	profitable	in	the	present	(central	bank	reserves)	they	will	automatically	want	to	exchange	them	for	assets	that	will	be	profitable	in	the	near	future	(equities).	When	operating	in	logical	time	liquidity	preference	is	not	a	significant	phenomenon	because	saving	is	merely	spending	that	will	occur	in	the	future,	and	the	future	and	present	are	functionally	interchangeable	in	the	model.		Perhaps	the	most	famous	and	persistent	critic	of	this	approach	was	Joan	Robinson	(1980:	228)	who	wrote	that:	‘in	real	life,	the	past	is	irrevocable	and	the	future	predicted	with	a	margin	of	uncertainty’	and	that	whilst	in	a	‘theoretical	model,	time	can	be	frozen…it	is	a	common	error	to	confuse	a	comparison	of	static	positions	with	a	movement	between	them.’	For	Post-Keynesians	such	as	Robinson	the	fact	that	savings	and	spending	decisions	necessarily	occur	one	after	another	is	fundamental	to	their	nature,	in	other	words	they	occur	in	historical	time.	Davidson	(2009:	326,	emphasis	
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added),	neatly	summarizes:	‘Time	is	a	device	for	preventing	everything	from	happening	at	once.’2	The	fact	that	events	occur	in	a	strict	temporal	sequence	means	that,	rather	than	future	and	the	past	being	theoretically	interchangeable,	the	future	is	inherently	
uncertain	to	agents	making	decisions	in	the	present.	Uncertainty	is	here	meant	in	the	distinctly	Keynesian	sense	not	simply	of	a	phenomenon	with	different	probabilities	of	different	outcomes	but	‘a	phenomenon	whose	probability	cannot	be	calculated’	(Ferrari-Filho	&	Augusto	Camargo,	2005:	582).	Money	‘by	its	characteristic	of	transporting	purchasing	power	over	time’	(Ferrari-Filho	&	Augusto	Camargo,	2005:	583)	therefore	becomes	a	necessity	in	the	historical	time	model	because	the	ability	to	hold	assets	in	their	liquid	form	is	the	essential	mediator	between	a	certain	present	and	an	uncertain	future.	A	model	operating	in	historical	time	therefore	sees	liquidity	preference	as	the	rational	reaction	to	future	uncertainty.	As	Ferrari-Filho	and	Augusto	Camargo	(2005:	583-4)	explain:	‘The	greater	the	uncertainty	surrounding	the	expectations	of	economic	agents,	the	more	these	will	be	inclined	to	postpone	spending	decisions	(the	greater	the	liquidity	preference).’	The	complication	that	arises	when	trying	to	apply	this	understanding	of	liquidity	preference	to	surplus	hoarding	in	Japan	is	that	the	consistent	secular	stagnation	Japan	has	experienced	for	the	last	three	decades	should	give	Japanese	firms	every	reason	not	to	be	uncertain	about	the	future,	meaning	their	liquidity	preference	should	be	low.	However,	understanding	the	inherited	structural	features	of	Japan’s	developmental	history	to	be	the	primary	motivations	for	the	current	high	level	of	liquidity	preference	(as	argued	in	the	previous	chapter)	is	compatible	with	an	understanding	of	liquidity	preference	as	operating	in	historical	time,	it	simply	requires	the	conception	of	historical	time	to	be	turned	to	face	the	other	direction,	past	rather	than	future.	If	historical	time	casts	liquidity	preference	as	the	mediator	between	present	investments	and	future	uncertainty,	then	it	might	be	legitimate	to	posit	that	there	could	be	another	form	of	liquidity	preference	–	path-dependent	liquidity	preference,	in	which	holding	assets	is	mediator	between	the	present	climate	for	investment	and	structural	constraints	or	institutional	behaviors	inherited	from	the	past.	In	the	same	essay	on	historical	time	Robinson	(1980:	228)	articulates	a	desire	to	understand	the	economy	in	a	similar	way	
																																																						
2	Davidson	primarily	articulates	this	logical	logical-historical	time	distinction	as	one	between	ergodic	and	non-ergodic	processes,	for	more	see	Davidson	(2009).	
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when	she	writes	that:		Swings	of	activity	must	be	seen,	not	as	starting	up	from	cold,	but	as	overlaying	slow	long-run	changes	in	productive	capacity	produced	by	accumulation,	technical	change	(including	changes	in	methods	of	operation	of	the	labour	force)	and	alterations	in	the	composition	of	output.		In	other	words,	in	the	case	of	investment,	for	Robinson	historical	time	does	not	only	imply	that	the	future	is	inherently	uncertain	in	the	present,	but	also	that	the	past	effects	the	present	by	imposing	its	own	structural	preconditions.		Turning	to	The	General	Theory,	Keynes	(2008)	defines	three	motivations	driving	liquidity	preference:		the	transactions	motive	-	in	which	cash	is	used	‘to	bridge	the	interval	between	the	receipt	of	income	and	its	disbursement’	(p.	125),	the	speculative	motive	–	in	which	cash	becomes	‘the	object	of	securing	profit	from	knowing	better	than	the	market	what	the	future	will	bring	forth’	(p.110)	and	the	precautionary	motive	where	Keynes	(p.	126)	describes	cash	covering	for	‘contingencies	requiring	sudden	expenditure	and	for	unforeseen	opportunities	of	advantageous	purchases.’	One	way	to	conceptualize	PDLP	within	the	traditional	Keynesian	framework	could	be	to	understand	it	as	a	form	of	the	precautionary	motive.	An	example	of	structural	features	of	the	economy	pushing	firms	towards	this	precautionary	motive	was	raised	in	the	previous	chapter	during	the	discussion	of	the	role	that	keiretsu	play	in	social	welfare,	where	it	was	argued	that	holding	assets	in	the	form	of	cash	and	reserves	was	a	‘logical’	response	to	the	possibility	of	future	downturns	-	one	of	Keynes’	‘contingencies	requiring	sudden	expenditure’.	In	this	case	having	such	a	liquid	balance	sheet	was	‘logical’	because	it	meant	in	the	event	of	a	downturn	firms	could	deleverage	without	downsizing	their	workforces.	However,	it	should	be	noted	here	that	any	recourse	to	comparisons	with	the	precautionary	motive	must	be	tempered	by	the	caveat	that,	as	argued	by	Fernando	(2010),	the	precautionary	motive	is	the	most	vaguely	defined	throughout	The	General	
Theory	and	is	at	times	simply	conflated	with	the	transactions	motive.		In	light	of	this	problem,	an	alternative	way	to	conceptualize	PDLP	would	be	instead	to	decompose	the	component	of	money	demand	that	aligns	to	the	speculative	motive	and	add	these	Japan	specific	structural	push	factors	as	a	separate	liquidity	preference	function.	In	The	General	Theory	Keynes	(2008:127)	presents	the	following	
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equation	for	money	demand.			M	=	M1	+	M2	=	L1(Y)	+	L2(r)	In	this	formulation	money	demand	(M)	has	two	components	(M1	and	M2)	which	are	determined	by	two	separate	liquidity	preference	functions	respectively	‘Where	L1	is	the	liquidity	function	corresponding	to	an	income	Y,	which	determines	M1,	and	L2	is	the	liquidity	function	of	the	rate	of	interest	r,	which	determines	M2.’	As	Minsky	(2008:	72)	points	out,	the	transactions	and	precautionary	motive	have	here	been	merged	into	a	single	function,	L1(Y)	(leading	to	more	confusion	over	the	role	of	precautionary	motive)	whilst	the	speculative	motive	is	represented	by	second	function	L2(r).	One	way	to	incorporate	PDLP	here	could	then	be	to	decompose	the	second	component	of	money	demand	(M2).	In	this	version	M2	would	correspond	not	only	to	the	interest	rate	(which	should	be	retained	to	represent	the	influence	of	the	BoJ’s	base	rate	as	discussed	in	chapter	3)	but	also	to	a	third	liquidity	preference	function:		L(Nw+Fc)	where	liquidity	preference	is	a	function	of	number	of	workers	(N)	multiplied	by	the	real	wage	(w)	plus	the	fixed	capital	stock	(Fc),	which	would	represent	the	effect	of	sunk	costs	in	labour	and	capital	respectively.	The	implication	here	would	be	that	if	N,	w	or	Fc	where	to	rise	then,	
ceteris	paribus,	PDLP	would	increase.	A	Japan	specific	formulation	of	a	full	equation	that	includes	PDLP	would	then	read	thus:	M	=	M1	+	M2	=	L1(Y)	+	L2(r)	+	L3(Nw+Fc)	The	speculative	motivation	is	the	one	which	relates	most	closely	with	the	concept	of	liquidity	preference	as	the	mediator	of	future	uncertainty,	therefore	incorporating	PDLP	into	this	speculative	motivation	has	the	advantage	that	it	comes	closest	to	reversing	the	causality	of	how	this	motive	operates	through	historical	time,	now	past-facing	as	well	as	future	facing	-	as	discussed	above.	It	also	avoids	relying	on	the	motivation	that	Keynes	defined	the	least	clearly	–	precautionary.	However,	the	disadvantage	is	that	it	excludes	factors	not	easily	expressed	in	the	form	of	Keynes’	original	money	demand	equation	such	as	the	third	structural	feature	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	lack	of	shareholder	pressure,	which	depends	to	a	significant	degree	on	the	corporate	governance	structure	and	culture	of	individual	firms.	It	should	be	noted	here	that	in	his	writing	after	The	General	Theory,	Keynes	added	a	fourth	motive,	the	finance	motive.	Here	Keynes	(1937)	argued	that	in	a	situation	in	which	the	rate	of	investment	was	
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increasing,	for	example	in	a	growing	economy,	the	money	required	to	finance	these	new	investments	would	constitute	a	forth	motive	behind	money	demand.	Although	this	motive	has	been	the	subject	of	much	scholarship	and	debate	within	the	Post-Keynesian	tradition	(see	Rochon,	1997),	it	is	less	relevant	to	the	contemporary	Japanese	context	because	(as	discussed	chapter	2)	investment	in	Japan	has	been	decreasing	for	many	years.		Ultimately	the	goal	here	is	not	to	find	definitive	precedent	for	any	complete	synthesis	of	structuralist	arguments	into	the	Keynesian	canon.	It	is	simply	to	demonstrate	that	the	centrality	of	historical	time	to	Post-Keynesian	definitions	of	liquidity	preference	creates	fertile	ground	for	the	possible	incorporation	of	structuralist	insights	that	view	the	economy	as	a	path-dependent	historical	process.	The	goal	of	this	formulation	of	PDLP	is	simply	to	adapt	these	more	general	Post-Keynesian	notions	of	liquidity	preference	into	something	that	can	incorporate	the	specificities	of	Japanese	developmental	history.	For	this	reason,	it	may	only	ever	be	applicable	to	the	Japanese	context	however,	it	hopefully	will	serve	to	provide	an	explanation	for	the	breakdown	of	QE	in	Japan.			
5.2	Path-dependent	liquidity	preference	and	quantitative	easing	in	Japan		 Now	that	this	formulation	of	liquidity	preference	has	been	put	into	the	theoretical	context	of	liquidity	preference	generally	it	is	necessary	to	articulate	exactly	how	this	phenomenon	has	interacted	with	the	2012	QE	program.	As	was	established	in	chapter	one,	the	success	of	QE	primarily	relies	on	the	portfolio	rebalancing	effect	which	in	turn	assumes	firms	are	rational	actors,	who	if	provided	liquid	assets,	will	naturally	purchase	assets	that	are	profitable	in	the	short-term.	As	was	discussed	in	chapter	4	however,	large	Japanese	firms	are	not	strictly	profit	motivated	as	they	have	inherited	institutionalized	behaviors	that	correspond	to	structural	features	of	Japan’s	developmental	model.	Each	of	these	features	make	it	contextually	‘rational’	for	Japanese	firms	to	hoard	assets	in	the	form	of	cash	or	deposits,	in	other	words	they	contribute	to	a	high	level	of	liquidity	preference.	Fig	5.1	shows	the	three	features	contributing	to	this	PDLP,	as	introduced	in	the	previous	chapter:	sunk	costs	in	fixed	capital,	sunk	costs	in	labour	and	lack	of	pressure	from	individual	shareholders.		
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Figure	5.1	Contributing	factors	to	path-dependent	liquidity	preference	As	was	established	in	chapter	3,	pumping	reserves	into	the	economy	will	not	automatically	encourage	investment	because,	if	we	assume	an	endogenous	money	supply,	banks	do	not	require	reserves	to	make	loans.	The	other	side	of	this	insight	is	that	if	liquidity	preference	is	high,	banks	and	firms	will	happily	absorb	excess	reserves	rather	than	exchanging	them	for	other	types	of	assets.	This	means	that	in	reality	the	transmission	mechanism	(or	perhaps	non-transmission	mechanism)	of	QE	in	Japan	has	gone	basically	as	follows:	The	BOJ	expanded	the	size	of	the	monetary	base	by	purchasing	safe	assets	(primarily	JGBs)	from	Japanese	banks	and	firms.	These	domestic	banks	and	firms,	which	have	a	consistently	high	PDLP,	were	happy	to	sell	bonds	in	exchange	for	a	liquid	asset	(central	bank	reserves)	but	did	not	rejoin	the	equity	market.	As	was	discussed	in	chapter	2,	foreign	firms,	for	a	short	period,	believed	that	the	expansion	of	base	money	would	corresponded	to	rising	equity	prices	as	it	briefly	did	in	the	US	and	UK	(Ueda,	2013:	262).	This	belief	briefly	became	a	self-fulfilling	prophecy	as	equity	prices	in	Japan	experienced	a	small	bump	on	the	back	of	foreign	investors,	which	also	disguised	the	fact	that	the	portfolio	rebalancing	mechanism	was	not	acutally	functioning.	Figure	5.2	shows	the	transmission	of	BoJ	QE	as	it	occurred	in	reality,	with	the	top	track	showing	the	actions	of	domestic	firms	as	governed	by	PDLP,	and	the	bottom	track	the	brief	spike	in	equity	prices	caused	by	foreign	investors.		
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Figure	5.2	The	transmission	mechanism	of	BoJ	QE	in	reality	There	is	a	type	of	portfolio	rebalancing	occurring	in	Japan	although	it	is	the	opposite	of	what	the	BoJ	wants.	The	logic	of	portfolio	rebalancing	assumes	that	firms	will	prefer	riskier	assets	to	liquid	assets,	in	reality,	PDLP	means	the	contemporary	Japanese	firms	actually	prefer	liquid	assets	to	risky	assets,	or	even	to	safe	assets.		Does	this	breakdown	mean	that	there	is	practically	speaking	no	effect	of	injecting	so	much	liquidity	into	the	economy?	Not	necessarily,	recall	that	in	Lucarelli’s	(2013:	358)	formulation	of	structural	endogenous	money	‘the	central	bank	is	able	to	set	the	short-term	base	rate	of	interest,	which	then	acts	as	the	official	anchor	or	benchmark	in	the	regulation	of	liquidity	within	the	banking	system.’	Hence	there	may	be	some	legitimacy	to	the	fears	of	dissenting	mainstream	economists	such	as	Koo	(2011:	76)	when	he	warns	that	if	for	some	reason	private	sector-borrowing	were	to	grow	rapidly	again	in	Japan	that	‘leaving	huge	quantities	of	liquidity	sloshing	around	in	the	banking	system’	could	risk	‘triggering	a	limitless	credit	expansion	fueled	by	the	commercial	banks.’	However,	this	seems	at	present	an	unlikely	situation.	This	project	has	argued	that	in	the	Japanese	context	liquidity	preference	has	become	an	entrenched	and	institutionalized	feature	of	firm	behavior.	It	is	therefore	not	clear	how	this	breakdown	in	the	QE	transmission	mechanism	could	be	resolved,	especially	considering	that	QE	relies	on	a	spurious	collection	of	essentially	neo-classical	assumptions	regarding	firms;	specifically,	that	they	rational	actors,	profit	motivated,	and	subject	to	exogenous	money.	
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Conclusion			 Beginning	in	2012	the	BoJ	implemented	a	QE	program	of	unprecedented	scale	hoping	to	create	a	revival	of	Japanese	equity	markets	via	the	portfolio	rebalancing	
mechanism,	and	subsequently	the	growth	of	domestic	demand	via	the	wealth	effect.	Because	the	transmission	mechanisms	of	this	program	were	premised	on	the	assumption	that	firms	are	profit	motivated	rational	actors	operating	in	a	system	of	exogenous	money,	they	were	not	designed	to	take	account	of	firms’	liquidity	preferences,	which	have	been	growing	in	Japan,	both	absolutely,	and	relative	to	investment,	since	the	early	1990s.	The	goal	of	this	project	was	to	investigate	both	how	liquidity	preference	disrupts	the	transmission	mechanisms	of	QE	in	Japan	and	why	this	liquidity	preference	is	so	high.		To	this	end	the	first	chapter	of	this	project	established	the	proposed	transmission	mechanisms	of	QE	and	argued	that	these	mechanisms	are	supported	by	neo-classical	assumptions	regarding	firm	behaviour.	The	second	chapter	addressed	the	empirical	assessments	of	QE	arguing	that	Japan	has	followed	the	global	trend	of	initial	positive	signs	followed	by	diminishing	returns.	The	third	chapter	established	how	the	logic	of	QE	relies	on	the	assumption	of	an	exogenous	money	supply	and	contrasted	this	with	a	Post-Keynesian	understanding	of	how	liquidity	preference	can	disrupt	QE	if	we	assume	an	endogenous	money	supply.	The	forth	chapter	utilized	insights	from	the	CDs	literature	in	order	to	understand	how	inherited	features	of	Japan’s	developmental	model	have	become	structural	barriers	that	bias	Japanese	firms	towards	savings	behaviour.	The	fifth	chapter	grounded	the	combination	of	these	Japan	specific	structural	insights	and	a	Post-Keynesian	understanding	of	the	money	market	from	the	previous	two	chapters	within	a	broader	discussion	of	liquidity	preference	and	historical	time.	This	was	in	order	to	propose	that	Japanese	firms	are	subject	to	a	form	of	path-dependent	
liquidity	preference	in	which	their	behaviour	runs	exactly	contrary	to	the	logic	of	portfolio	rebalancing.	Rather	than	preferring	risker,	more	profitable	assets	to	safe	less	profitable	ones,	Japanese	firms	prefer	liquid	assets	to	either.	Rather	than	examining	the	policy	consequences	of	QE’s	implementation,	or	suggesting	alternative	monetary	policies,	the	twin	goals	of	this	project	were	to	attempt	to	better	understand	the	failures	of	monetary	policy	transmission	mechanisms	in	Japan	as	well	as	to	demonstrate	how	
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Japan’s	unique	developmental	history	can	make	it	a	fertile	ground	of	the	combination	of	Post-Keynesian	and	structuralist	understandings	of	liquidity	preference.			 	
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